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What Does Globalization Have to Do With the Erosion of Welfare States? 

Sorting Out the Issues 

Introouction 
For a long time, I, along with many others, have been thinking about the relationships 
between changes in the international political economy and changes in those institutional 
arrangements within the advanced capitalist countries (ACCs), principally transfer payments and 
collective services, comprising what we refer to as the welfare state (WS).1 Only recently, 
however, have I been thinking about how to design a study to explore those relationships 
systematically. This paper reports on what I have done so far in the hope that it will elicit 
cricitisms and comments that will help me go further. 
The study has two starting points. One is the observation that the WS is under strain, 
subject to political attack, and being rolled back in varying degrees in almost all of the ACCs. 
This is a matter of concern to me on the normative ground that the WS, whatever flaws 
particular variants may have, is a major historical achievement, rendering capitalism more 
compatible with a whole range of human values than it would otherwise be.2 However, it is 
not the purpose of the study to elaborate the grounds for this view, important as it admittedly is 
to do so.3 The second is the widely held belief that what is happening to WS is somehow the 
consequence of changes occurring in the international economic environment in which they 
operate. The term "globalization" is typically used to encompa'ls those changes. The changes 
referred to are changes in the operation of capitalism. If capitalism is becoming globalized, the 
capacity of national institutions in the ACCs to condition its operations so as to protect the 
1. The abbreviation "WS" will normally be used for welfare states in the plural. When 
used for a welfare state or the welfare state in the singular, that will be made clear by preceding it 
with a singular article. 
2. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957) is an eloquent, 
thought not philosophically systematic, statement of the human values at stake which is at the same 
time concerned with the international dimension of markets. 
3. In lieu of referring to the large literature on ideology in social science, it may suffice here 
to mention the admonition to economists to acknowledge the values embedded in their analyses by 
Gunnar Myrdal in his The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953). See also his Value in Social Theory (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1958). 
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values which WS have functioned to protect, the historical achievement embodied in the WS is 
in jeopardy. 4 The main purpose of the study is to probe this belief. 
A lot of things have patently been happening in the extent and modalities of transborder 
economic activity; they look like pretty big things, so it seems hard to resist the impression that 
they have so changed the environment in which WS operate that WS are forced to change, 
possibly in ways that make it impossible for them to perform the distributive functions they 
came to perform in the earlier postwar era. Accordingly, the belief that economic globalization 
is eroding WS seems highly plausible. Many of the arguments to be found in the literature, 
both academic and polemic, lend support to it. But is it true? It may be that the changing 
international environment does not necessarily impose all the imperatives invoked as reasons 
why the welfare state has to be rolled back or changed in various ways to meet new economic 
imperatives, typically summed up as competitiveness, and that such claims about globalization 
and competitiveness are simply new ideological smokesereens behind which old inegalitarian 
goals are being pursued. Bome skepticism definitely seems in order, for there are arguments to 
be found that provide some grounds for it. 
So the first step is to try to sort out the issues raised by these conflicting arguments 
concerning the economic mechanisms by which pressures are put on WS, whether the pressures 
are exerted by globalization or not. This is what I try to do in this paper. However, the 
changes taking place in WS are obviously the result of political choices. If pressures exerted by 
globalization have anything to do with those changes, it is only through the political choices 
made in response to the pressures. Diverse responses, with diverse consequences for WS, may 
accordingly be possible. Thus, the changes taking place in WS are to be explained by the 
political mcchanisms that determine the choices among the responses rather than by the 
economic mechanisms that exert the pressures, whatever the sources of those pressures. Indeed 
the political choices resulting in changes in WS may not be responses to pressures exerted by 
economic mechanisms at all. So in order to understand what is happening to WS it is necessary 
to analyze the political mechanisms that produce them, establishing whether they are in fact 
responses to pressures exerted by economic mechanisms, as well as whether those pressures 
are exerted by globalization or not. That political analysis is the second step in the study. I 
4. An aspect of what some argue is the more general obsolescence of national states in the 
face of globalization. 
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have come to some tentative conclusions about how to take the first step, but I have only begun 
to try to figure out how to take the second. So comments and criticisms concerning the first and 
suggestions about the second would be very welcome. 
In order to sort out the issues dividing the various arguments concerning the economic 
mechanisms thought to exert pressures on WS, I have grouped the arguments into three 
different answers to the question posed in the title. The first is that globalization has everything 
to do with the erosion of WS -- that changes in the international economy arc making it 
impossible to maintain WS. The second is that globalization has nothing to do with it -- that 
developments endogenous to the ACCs are undermining WS. The third is that globalization 
does have something to do with it, in partial agreement with the first, but that it does so 
specifically by amplifying the endogenous development to which the erosion of WS is ascribed 
in the second. Thus, the first and second are both partly right, but only partly, because neither 
the international nor domestic factors they respectively invoke are sufficient; it is rather the 
specific way the two sets of factors are linked that explains the erosion of WS. As may be 
suspected, the more complex third argument seems most plausible to me. 
I proceed as follows. First, I briefly profile those changes in the international 
environment of WS to which the term "economic globalization" refers. The term is used in 
different ways. Here I simply present some data to establish that transborder economic activity 
has indeed increased sufficiently to render plausible the idea of increasing economic 
globalization. Then I raise the question of how globalization should be expected to have effects 
that could have something to do with the erosion of WS. I argue that such effects should 
operate primarily through any impact globalization might have on the operation of labor 
markets, particularly the levels of unemployment, inequality and poverty to which WS 
institutions are geared to respond. Such labor market effects strain the capacity of WS to meet 
their commitments, enlarging the political scope for responding to the strain by reducing and 
even abandoning those commitment'>. To the extent that policies which do so are implemented, 
the labor market effects are amplified, However, the observable trends toward increased 
unemployment, inequality and poverty, and policies which may contribute to them, arc not 
necessarily the effects of globalization and policy responses to those effect'>, Whether they arc 
or not, or if so how, are the issues dividing the three arguments to be considered. The stage is 
thereby set for comparing the arguments. I conclude the comparison by indicating tentatively 
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the conclusions I suspect should be drawn from it. I then tum to a brief discussion of how I 
think the second step in the study might proceed. 
Dimensions of Economic Globalization 
As a first approximation, we can describe economic globalization in terms of trends 
along several distinct dimensions. One is international trade. Over the roughly three decades 
between 1960 and 1989, exports of the 24 OECD countries have grown at an average annual 
rate close to twice that of GDP, 6.3 per cent compared with 3.7 percent. The share of imports 
and exports in those countries' GDP correspondingly increased over the same period, more than 
doubling from the relatively low initial level of 9.6 percent to 20.6 percent in the U.S. and 
growing by under half from the much higher initial OECD average of 37.6 percent to 56.3 
percent.5 Clearly, trade has been increasingly linking national economies together. 
While trade has grown faster than output, foreign direct investment (FDI) is now 
growing faster than trade. World outflows of FDI grew 3 times faster than output and 2.5 times 
faster than both exports and domestic investment between 1986 and 1990.6 The annual rate of 
FDI more than quadrupled from $39.8 billion in the late 1970s to $167.2 billion in the 1986-92 
period.7 Correspondingly, the world stock of FDI nearly quadrupled between 1980 and 
1991.8 By 1990, total sales (domestic and export) of transnational corporations (TNCs)9 
5. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Historical 
Statistics 1960-1989 (Paris: OECD, 1991), Tables 3.1 and 4.8. 
6. World Investment Directoty, Vol. 3 (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. v. 
7 Bank for International Settlements, Sixty Third Annual Report (Basle: Bank: for 
International Settlements, 1993), pp. 90-91. 
8World Investment Directory, 1992, Vol. 3, p. v. 
9. A variety of terms are used to refer to the organizational forms through which FDI takes 
place, such as multinational corporation, multinational enterprise, multi domestic corporation, 
global corporation or enterprise, and transnational corporation or enterprise. While the terms are 
often used interchangeably, the forms differ in various respects. I follow Peter Dicken in using 
transnational corporation (TNC) as a generic term covering a broad range of forms, but it should 
be noted that these include forms those not captured by statistics of FDI. The following definition, 
cited by Dicken, attempts to embrace this broad range of forms: "A transnational is the means of 
co-ordinating production from one centre of strategic decision making when this co-ordination 
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reached $5.5 trillion, which was 2.5 times the $2.2 trillion total value of exports of goods and 
services (excluding intra-firm trade, i.e., trade within TNCs))O These trends are the basis of 
the contention that TNCs "have become central organizers of economic activities in an 
increasingly integrated world economy."11 
Financial integration has been occurring even more rapidly than integration through trade 
and FDI. While there was a more than fourfold rise in average annual outflows of FDI from the 
late 1970s to 1986-92, portfolio outflows rose fourteen times, from $15.0 billion to $205.3 
billion over the same period -- from a level substantially less than direct investment to a level 
considerably greater. 12 Rapid as this rise in portfolio capital movements has been, it has been 
dwarfed by the growth of transactions in foreign exchange markets, from a daily trading volume 
that was "negligible" in the late 1950s to about a $trillion in the early 1990s. This was nearly 
"forty times the daily value of international trade."13 Another measure of how much it 
exceeded the financing needs of the "real economy" is that five days' worth of foreign exchange 
transactions are equivalent to a "full year's exports worldwide of goods and services," while 24 
days' worth of those transactions are equivalent to a "full year's output of world goods and 
services."14 Thus, financial markets have been even more thoroughly globalized than markets 
takes a firm across national boundaries." Peter Dicken, Global Shift: The Internationalization of 
Economic Activity, sec. ed., (London: Paul Chapman Publishing Ltd, 1992), p. 48. See also the 
discussion by Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, "The Problem of 'Globalization': International 
Economic Relations, National Economic Management and the Formation of Trading Blocs," 
Economy and Society 21, 4 (November 1992). 
10. World Investment Directory. 1992, Vol. 3, p. v. According to Dicken, "these data 
massively understate the real level ofTNC activity." Dicken, Global Shift, p. 48. 
11. World Investment Directory, 1992, Vol. 3, p. v. 
12. Bank for International Settlements, Sixty Third Annual Report 1993, pp. 90-91. 
13. Barry Eichengreen, International Monetary Arrangements for the 21st Century 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 60. This figure refers to transactions on 
the 9 major national markets in April 1992. After making a number of adjustments to eliminate 
double-counting and allow for recording gaps, Eichengreen estimates the daily volume at the 
slightly lower amount of $880 billion. Ibid., p. 61. 
14. Financial Times March 27, 1995. 
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for the production and sale of goods and non-financial services. In all these dimensions, then, 
economic globaliza.tion is apparently integrating national economies into what is increasingly a 
single world economy. If so, it is evidently one to which there is no corresponding political 
structure capable of regulating it, as states could once regulate national economies. IS 
This brings us back to the question in the title. For our purposes, the key difference among the 
three answers to that question concerns the explanations they offer for labor market 
developments in the ACCs over the past two decades or so. We tum to why this is so. 
Labor Markets: The Linkage Between Globalization and Welfare States 
If the effect of giobali7Ation is to undermine WS, it must operate through its impact on 
labor markets, particularly on levels of unemployment and the associated levels of labor market 
participation and earnings ineqUality. In the simplest terms, globalization undermines WS to 
the extent that it increases unemployment. The more unemployment there is, the greater the 
burden of expenditures to which WS are committed at the same time that it is more difficult to 
finance them (all of them, not just those on the unemployed), increasing the likelihood of fiscal 
crisis. Hence, full employment can be regarded as an essential condition for the viability of 
WS, as William Beveridge insisted in his design for a welfare state in Britain after the Second 
World War. 16 So whatever makes it more difficult, or ultimately impossible, to meet that 
condition, whether it is changes in the international economy or something else, undermines 
WS. The three arguments differ over whether, or if so how, it is changes in the international 
economy that do so. 
The proposition that the viability of WS is contingent on full employment is familiar and 
presumably generally accepted -- it is hard to think of welfare states as anything but ''full 
employment welfare states" or "Keynesian welfare states." But it is probably useful to spell out 
15. Many conclude from this that the capacity of national states to manage the economy 
within its borders, and hence a large part of national sovereignty, is disappearing. Charles 
Kindleberger, the reknown historian of the international economy, anticipated this as long ago as 
1969 when he said that "the nation-state is just about through as an economic unit." Quoted in 
Nathan Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy: International Finance and the State (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p.3. For a broad discussion on the topic, "What Future 
for the State?", see Daedalus, Spring 1995, especially Vincent Cable, "The Diminished Nation­
State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power." 
16. William H. Beveridge, Full Employment in a Free Society (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1944). 
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a bit more precisely the view of the relationships between WS institutions and labor markets on 
which the proposition is predicated. In this view, labor market and WS institutions interact so 
as to jointly determine the distribution of aeeess to resources or, as Richard Titmuss put it, 
"command-over-resources."17 Except to the extent that it is obtained through aeeumulated 
wealth, the vast bulk of people in the ACCs gain aeeess to resources in two ways: income 
obtained through participation in the labor market -- earnings from work and the alternatives 
to it provided by WS institutions. Insofar as those institutions provide alternatives, they are 
coneeived as diminishing dependenee on participation in the labor market (or on persons who 
participate in the labor market) -- hence the notion that they are in varying degree 
"decommodifying."18 Because market pressures are thereby blunted, the bargaining power of 
parties to labor market transactions tends to be altered in favor of the sellers, i.e., labor, 
affecting the operation of labor markets and hence of the economy as a whole, including the 
possibilities for full employment. Precisely because of the effects of WS on labor markets, as is 
well known, critics of WS claim that they impair the functioning of labor markets and are 
thereby responsible for unemployment. 19 
17. Richard M. Titmuss, Ineome Distribution and Social Change (London: George allen & 
Unwin, 1962), p.198. 
18. Drawing on the idea of decommodification developed by Polanyi, G0sta Esping­
Andersen uses it in distinguishing among patterns of social policy in The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). The idea is problematic as well as 
attractive. In any case, it points to the need to think of social policy as components of the whole 
range of institutions that structure the operation of labor markets, or in which labor markets can be 
said to be "embedded," including trade unions and legislated labor standards, so that they should 
be conceived as jointly forming "labor regimes." I discuss this briefly in Andrew Martin, "Labour, 
the Keynesian Welfare State, and the Changing International Economy," in Richard Stubbs and 
Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, eds., Political Eeonomyand the Changing Global Order (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart, Inc., 1994), p. 63. 
19. There is, of course, a large literature on this. Recently, much of it has expressed or 
criticized the view that WS alternatives are exeessively generous and cause unemployment to be 
higher than it would otherwise be, at least in continental Europe and Canada, so that sealing them 
back would improve the efficiency of labor markets and reduee unemployment. That view is put 
strongly with respect to Sweden in Assar Lindbeek et al., Turning Sweden Around (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1994) and more circumspectly with respect to eontinental Europe in 
Commission of the European Communities, Growth, Competitiveness and Unemployment 
(Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 1993) and OECD, The GECD Jobs Study 
(Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1994). The view is subjected to 
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That is an issue to which we later return.20 What is crucial for us at this point is that the 
provision of access to resources by WS institutions at the same time depends on earnings from 
work insofar as they comprise most of the income stream that is tapped to finance the provision. 
The viability of WS depends on the relationship between the magnitude of that income stream 
and the magnitude of the expenditures to be financed -- the larger the former is relative to the 
latter, the easier it is both economically and politically to maintain WS, and vice-versa. Clearly, 
a large part of what WS do is to channel a portion of the work earnings of those who are 
employed to those who are not for various reasons during the life course -- the young who are 
not yet participating in the labor force, those of working age who are participating but 
temporarily not working because they are unemployed, sick, taking care of family members, 
etc., and those who have permanently left the labor force. The result is a social distribution of 
access to resources different from -- typically more equal than -- the distribution of earnings 
from work. 21 But the categories of people whose earnings are tapped to provide the alternative 
forms of access to resources and the recipients of those forms are overlapping rather than 
separate groups, for employed people can also be current recipients, not only of income 
supplements (e.g., transfers or implicit transfers, via tax provisions, targetted to those with low 
scrutiny in Rebecca Blank, ed., Social Protection versus Economc Flexibility (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press for NBER, 1994); Richard B. Freeman, ed., Working Under Different Rules 
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1994); and Werner Sengenberger and Duncan Campbell, 
eds., Creating Economic Opportunities: The Role of Labour Standards in Industrial Restructuring 
(Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 1994). 
20. See below, p. 14. 
21. Post-transfer inequality in family income rose less than inequality in earnings during 
the 1980s in all of seven countries covered by the Luxembourg study except the United States, in 
which post-transfer inequality rose more than earnings inequality. Peter Gottschalk, "Changes in 
Inequality of Family Income in Seven Industrialized Countries," American Economic Review 83, 
2 (May 1993). See also Katherine McFate, Timothy Smeeding, and Lee Rainwater, "Markets and 
States: Poverty Trends and Transfer System Effectiveness in the 1980s," in Katherine McFate, 
Roger Lawson, and William Julius Wilson, eds., Poverty, Inequality and the Future of Social 
Policy (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995). 
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work income) but also services such as health care insofar as they are universal.22 Indeed the 
extent of the overlap is probably an important factor contributing to the political viability of WS, 
along with the extent to which those whose earnings comprise the tax base for WS expect to be 
future recipients. 23 Those whose work income is earned from employment in the WS service 
sector are of course simultaneously, though in different degrees, contributors and recipients. 
Whatever the extent of the overlap, the larger the proportion of the population 
comprising the tax base, over which the tax burden of financing a given level of aggregate 
expenditures on transfers and services comprising WS is spread, the smaller the individual 
share of the burden, the easier it is to finance WS, and, presumably, the stronger the electoral 
support for it (a large WS is not necessarily less viable than a small one, providing the burden 
of financing it is sufficiently widely spread; it may even be more viable if stakes in it are as 
widely spread). In other words, the closer an economy is to full employment, not only in the 
sense of lower unemployment but also higher labor market participation rates, the greater the 
22. Thus, it is misleading to speak of the crucial ratio as one of contributors to recipients 
insofar as it implies that they constitute two mutually exclusive groups, except in particular cases 
such as those at work who contribute to pension schemes and the retired who receive pension 
benefits. Even then they are mutually exclusive groups only on a current basis and not over the life 
course. And even then it is not strictly accurate insofar as pension income is taxable. 
23. Hence the common assumption that universal benefits have more robust electoral 
support than those targetted to the poor or some category of current recipients that can be 
rhetorically separated from current payers of taxes. 
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economic and, in tum, the political viability of WS.24 This is why globalization undermines 
WS most fundamentally insofar as it makes full employment unattainable. 
For whatever reasons, labor markets have increasingly fallen short of full employment 
throughout the A CCs, but especially in Europe, over the last couple of decades or so. This is 
dramatically illustrated by Chart 1, which shows total unemployment in the OECD area from 
1950 to 1993.25 There is a sharp turning point at the beginning of the 19708. From 1950 until 
then, the total averaged under 10 million around a slightly declining trend. Since then, 
especially after the first OPEC oil shock, it rose abruptly, briefly reversing before the second oil 
shock only to rise even more precipitously to three times the level of the 1950s and 1960s in 
1982. During the prolonged expansion in the rest of the decade the total declined but only to 25 
24. Note that labor market participation rates at different ages depends on the political 
definition of when "working age" begins and ends. This is obscured by much of the talk about 
demographic trends, namely the growing proportion of the population receiving pensions because 
they are living longer beyond retirement relative to those still in the workforce, for whom the 
"burden of supporting" retirees is increased, as a source of problems for WS. There are problems 
but they are the artifact of political definitions of retirement age and of economies apparently unable 
to provide full employment at constant rates of labor market participation for a population that is 
living longer -- i.e., generating sufficient jobs to employ both new entrants and workers who exit 
from the labor force at successively later ages. 
Much more is involved in the economic viability of WS than such relationships between 
aggregate contributions and aggregate benefits. It has to do with the consistency of WS 
institutions and all the other institutions (including those that structure transborder transactions) 
which jointly determine an economy's growth path, or "model of development." The idea is nicely 
captured in the French "regulation" approach, in which all the institutions that structure labor 
markets form components of "mode of regulation" that make possible a specific "regime of 
accumulation." In this view, probably familiar to most, the relationships between contributions 
and benefits is just one of the ways in which there has to be consistency between the various 
components with all the others in order for the regime of accumulation to have "coherence." When 
coherence is impaired, the regime of accumulation falters, growth slows, crisis may ensue, and a 
new regime of accumulation may have to come into being for growth to be restored that it would 
come into being is in no way inevitable. Closely related is the American "social structure of 
accumulation" approach. The two are compared in David M. Kotz, Terence McDonough, and 
Michael Reich, eds., Social Structures of Accumulation: The Political Economy of Growth and 
Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
An accessible analysis of the mechanism of growth in the ACCs during the "golden age" 
and how the coherence among its components eroded built on a loose synthesis of the two 
approaches is provided by Andrew Glyn etaL, in Stephen Marglin and Juliet Schor, eds., The 
Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting the Post-war Experience (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990). In a fuller discussion of the issues addressed in this paper, it would be necessary to 
show the linkages between WS institutions and the whole regime of accumulation and its internal 
strains along similar lines. 
25. OECD, The OECD Jobs Study! p. 9. 
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Chart 1. Unemployment in the OECD area 
1950-95 
35 35 
30 30 
25 25 
(/) 
c: 
~ 20 20 
~ 
OEeD projections
15 15 
10 10 
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Jobs Study: Facts, 
Analysis, Strategies (Paris: OECD, 1994), p. 9. 
12 
Chart 2. Unemployment rates in OECD regions,1950-95 
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million, and following the deep recession at the beginning of this decade it rose by what is 
projected to be another 10 million by 1995. Of course, the total labor force has increased so 
unemployment rates have not increased as much as the absolute numbers, but it is sobering to 
recognize that thc equivalent of the entire working age population of a medium sized or several 
small European countries is now jobless. 
This picture of increasing unemployment in the ACCs has to be nuanced by the fact that 
its geographic distribution has been uneven and changing. Among the five areas into which the 
OECD is divided in Chart 2, North America had higher average unemployment rates than the 
rest until the late 1970s, when European Community (EC) rates caught up and surpassed them. 
The EFfA countries and Oceania have currently joined the EC in experiencing higher rates, 
ranging between 8 and 11 percent, than in North America, where they have declined from a 
peak of 9.5 percent in 1982 and a lower peak of 7.5 percent in 1992 to a current level of 7 
percent. Only Japan is shown as having lower rates than the others throughout, although its 
labor market is sufficiently different from those of the others that adjustments aimed at achieving 
comparability are even more problematical than in the other cases.26 It is difficult to determine 
how much of the current levels reflect continuing trends or short term fluctuations but the long 
term trends are quite clcar: since the early 1970s, unemployment has increased throughout the 
ACCs, with the increase continuing in Europe and partially reversing in North Ameriea. 
The rather striking reversal in relative unemployment rates of Europe and North Ameriea 
between the early postwar deeades and the more recent deeades is partially paralleled by similar 
trends in earnings ineqUality. Generalizing loosely, there has been an increase in earnings 
inequality almost everywhere in the OECD, reversing earlier trends toward decreasing 
inequality, but the increase in inequality has been considerably greater in the U.S. than in all 
other countries except Britain. Greater differentiation among the other countries is indicated by 
an analysis of changes in educational and oceupational differentials in tcn ACCs between the 
1970s and 1980s by Richard B. Freeman and Lawrence F. Katz. 27 Aceording to the data they 
summarize, inequality continued, to decline only in the Netherlands. It stopped declining but did 
26. Ibid., p. 10. 
27. Richard B. Freeman and Lawrence F. Katz, "Rising Wage Inequality: The United 
States vs. Other Advanced Countries," in Freeman, ed., Workins Under Different Rules. 
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not increase in France, Germany and Italy, rose moderately in four other countries, and rose a 
lot in the U.K. and U.S.28 However, the U.S. still stands alone in the form which the 
increased earnings inequality has taken and the extent to which it has been passed on into 
inequality in living standards without any mitigation by WS institutions. Although inequality 
rose in both the U.S. and U.K.more than anywhere else (even more in the u.K. than the U.S. 
by some measures), in Britain "real earnings for all workers rose rapidly, so that despite greater 
inequality, the real pay of those at the bottom of the distribution grew .... By contrast, in the 
United States real earnings at the bottom of the earnings distribution fell sharply. From 1979 to 
1989 the real earnings of lower-decile Americans dropped by 11 to 17 percent (depending on 
the survey used) compared to an increase in the real earnings of lower-decile British workers of 
12 percent. "29 
At the same time, inequality in earnings as well as total family income (standardized for 
family size) was at least partially offset by social policy, in the form of tax provisions and 
transfers, so that inequality in total family income was lower than inequality in earnings, in most 
of seven ACCs included in a study based on LIS data for the 1980s, with the exception of the 
U.S. and Netherlands. But post-transfer family income was still much greater and increased 
more in the U.S. than in any of the other countries.30 In another study based on LIS data, the 
28. It should be emphasized that different measures produce different results, such as a 
slight decline rather than slight increase in Germany, a slight increase rather than slight decrease in 
the Netherlands, and an increase in Canada as large as in the U.S., but the broad pattern of 
variation, especially the contrast between the U.S. and continental Europe, is not appreciably 
altered. 
29. Freeman and Katz, "Rising Wage Inequality," p. 40. Emphasis in the original. 
30. Peter Gottschalk, "Changes in Inequality of Family Income in Seven Industrialized 
Countries" American Economic Review 83, 2 (May 1993). This study includes Australia and 
omits Germany. The measure of inequality used is the ratio of 90th to the 10th decile person or 
family in the respective distribution. 
The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data on which the study is based, while probably the 
most comprehensive and comparable available, is not very satisfactory for analyzing changes over 
time because they cover two years, around the beginning of the 1980s and around the middle of the 
decade, depending on the country, which span a rather brief period. The data are better for cross­
national comparisons in the years which they cover. 
The Netherlands case seems anomalous. Part of the explanation may lie in the fact that the 
Netherlands had the lowest or next lowest (after Spain in 1983) labor force participation rate in the 
OECD, 59 percent compared with an OECD Europe average of 66 percent and a U.S. rate of 73 
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u.s. was again the outlier in the extent to which households headed by non-elderly poor are 
lifted out of poverty by income-support programs in seven ACCs, defining poverty line as 50 
percent of median income. Virtually no such households were lifted out of poverty by U.S. 
social policy (0.3 percent in 1979 and 0.5 percent in 1986), while the incomes of from one-fifth 
(Canada) to three-fifths (Netherlands) of the households that were below the-poverty line before 
taxes and transfers in the other six countries were brought above the line after taxes and 
transfers. 31 Generally, increased unemployment was accompanied by increased inequality and 
poverty, but the relationship varied greatly.32 In the U.S., however, increased inequality in 
earnings and retrenchment in social policy contributed to increased poverty despite decreased 
unemployment. 
Thus, there appears to have been a trade-off, with the U.S. experiencing higher 
employment (higher participation as well as lower unemployment) at the cost of greater 
inequality and poverty than in Europe (and to some extent Canada), while Europe experienced 
less increase in inequality in both earnings and post-tax and transfer incomes and in poverty at 
the apparent cost of less employment. This is often explained as reflecting differences in labor 
market and WS institutions through which common economic forces are refracted (what those 
forces are is at the center of the differences among the three arguments we have to compare).33 
percent in 1983. The Netherlands also had the next highest (again after Spain) unemployment rates 
in the 1980s. If the low participation rate reflected exit from the labor market primarily by 
unemployed low-paid workers, given relatively generous unemployment and social assistance 
benefits, this could account for the small change (increase or decrease, depending on the data used) 
and relatively low level of earnings inequality in the Netherlands -- i.e., the low paid dropped out 
of the earnings distribution. At the same time, a higher proportion of households that were poor 
before taxes and transfers were lifted out of poverty by taxes and transfers in the Netherlands than 
any other country covered by LIS data. Labor force data from OECD Economic Outlook, July 
1994, pp. 202-03. For source on poverty, see the next footnote. 
31. Katherine McFate, Timothy Smeeding, and Lee Rainwater, "Markets and States: 
Poverty Trends and Transfer System Effectiveness in the 1980s," in Katherine McFate, Roger 
Lawson, and Wilham Julius Wilson, eds., Poverty, Inequality, and the Future of Social Policy: 
Western States in the New World Order (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995), especially 
pp. 38-39. This study differs from the one cited in the preceding footnote in that it includes the 
former West Germany and excludes Australia. 
32. Ibid., pp. 33-38. 
33. For example, Gottschalk, "Changes in Inequality of Family Income," p. 136. 
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The lesson drawn from this by many European economists and politicans, as is well known, is 
that the employment peIfonnance of the "great American jobs machine," can only be matched by 
reducing the "rigidities" with which excessive union power, excessively restrictive labor 
legislation, and an excessively generous WS allegedly afflict European labor markets so as to 
achieve the "flexibility" of the U.S. labor market.34 This may be the wrong lesson to be 
learned, as suggested by Freeman when he points out that the "sizable reductions in pay for the 
less skilled in the US have not been sufficient to maintain their employment; have impoverished 
them and their families; and arguably contributed to the decision of many of them to engage in 
crime."35 Lower aggregate wage growth rather than a greater increase in inequality may have 
contributed to lower U.S. unemployment, according to Freeman, while others point to deficient 
demand, due to more restrictive macroeconomic policies in Europe, to account for higher 
unemployment in Europe.36 Whatever economic forces or policies have been causing the 
varying levels of unemployment (whether they are common or not), it seems to be associated 
with a deterioration in the capacity of WS institutions to bring about lower poverty and 
inequality than market forces would otherwise produce. Understanding the links between 
variations in unemployment and these socia-economic outcomes obviously requires analysis of 
variations in the labor market and WS institutions that still structure the operation of the different 
labor markets and how they have been changed by political responses to economic forces. Our 
immediate task is not to offer such an analysis but to consider the conflicting arguments 
concerning the nature of those forces, around which the discussion that follows is organized. 
Globalization Has Everything to do With It 
34. The alleged economic costs of WS are of course an old story but its recent 
development can be traced back to Herbert Gierseh's diagnosis of "Eurosclerosis" [reference to be 
supplied]. For literature on the debate over this issue, see footnote 20. 
35. Richard B. Freeman, "The Limits of Wage Aexibility to Curing Unemployment," 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 11,1 (Spring 1994), p.72. 
36. Ibid., p. 70; Stephen Nickell and Brian Bell, "The Collapse in Demand for the 
Unskilled and Unemployment Across the OECD," Oxford Review of Economic Policy 11, 1 
(Spring 1994). 
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The arguments that attribute the erosion of WS to increasing internationalization or 
globalization of the economy run along two lines. One concentrates on production the "real 
economy" -- and the other on finance. 
1. The Globalization of Production. 
According to the first, a spatial redistribution and reorganization of production, initially 
of manufactured goods and increasingly of services as well, is taking place. The growth in FDI 
whose overall dimensions were summarized above is viewed as the main mechanism through 
which it has been occurring. Some distinguish two variants of the argument.37 One focuses 
primarily on the redistribution of production from the "North," consisting of the already 
industrialized or "developed" countries of Europe, North America and (in most discussions) 
Japan, to the "South," consisting of the newly industrializing or "less developed" countries of 
Asia and Latin America. The other focuses more broadly on the relocation and restructuring of 
production throughout the world, within the North and South as well as from North to South. 
The first is referred to as the "new international divisionof labor" (NIDL) argument while the 
term "globalization" is reserved for the second. The discussion here is initially confined to the 
first. 
Folker Frobel and his colleagues, who gave this line of argument its classic formulation, 
argue that the production of manufactured goods (to which their analysis is limited) is being 
redistributed from the old industrialized countries of the North, in which such production was 
virtually entirely confined until recently, to the newly industrializing countries of the South, in 
which such production is rapidly increasing.38 From their "world systems" perspective, this is 
fundamentally transforming the structure of the "world capitalist system." This is being brought 
about through investment in new production sites in the South by TNCs based in the Northern 
38. David M. Gordon, "The Global Economy: New Edifice or Crumbling Foundations?" 
New Left Review 168 (March-April 1988). This is an important summary and critique of the 
argument that the international redistribution of production is the source of the economic troubles -­
slow growth, unemployment, ete. -- in the ACCs, to which we shall refer later on. The core of 
Gordon's argument has also been published in David M. Kotz, Terence McDonough, and Michael 
Reich, eds., Social Structures of Accumulation: The Political Economy of Growth and Crisis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
38. Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreile, The New International Division of 
Labor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). 
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"core" of the world capitalist system. They are doing so in response to possibilities for 
profitable production opened up in the "periphery" by three conditions: 1) a flow of migrants 
from the countryside into the cities of the developing countries that has created "a practically 
inexhaustible reservoir" of "extremely cheap" labor;" 2) a "division and subdivision of the 
production process" that fragments it into operations that "can be carried out with minimal levels 
of skill easily learnt;" and 3) the development of transportation and communication technologies 
that makes it possible to produce the fragmented parts of "goods at any site in the world."39 
These conditions are reinforced by others, notably institutional arrangements that assure 
profitable exploitation of cheap labor such as repression of unions and freedom from any labor 
health and safety and other requirements, particularly through the establishment of export 
processing zones. 40 
The result has been a proliferation of sites for profitable production of manufactured 
goods for export in the South. Once Northern companies started investing in these sites in 
order to take advantage of the possibilities for profitable production they offer, the terms of 
competition among them were irrevocably altered, making such investment an imperative of 
survival for all companies, which is why the process amounts to a fundamental structural 
change in the world economy, described as a "new international division of labor" (NIDL). In 
contrast with the old division of labor in which the North exported manufactured goods while 
the South exported raw materials, the South now also exports manufactured goods, which 
compete with the goods produced in the North not only for export but for domestic markets as 
well. This shift in the pattern of trade reflects not only a relocation of manufactured goods 
production but also its reorganization. The different components or stages into which the 
production of final goods is fragmented are produced in subsidiaries of TNCs all over the 
globe, in the North as well as the South, depending on where it can be done most profitably, 
and combined in centrally controlled production chains. Companies that fail to organize such 
global production chains, shifting to the South production of all fragments that can be 
39. Ibid., 13, 5. 
40. Frobel et al ascribe the growth of industrial production for export (as opposed to 
earlier import substitution industrialization, virtually entirely to multinational companies based in 
the North, and describe it as taking place largely in export processing zones. pp. 
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manufactured with the cheap unksilled labor in unlimited supply there, or to become parts of 
such chains organized by TNCs, will ultimatcly be unable to survive.41 
The WS of the North are undermined by the NIDL as a direct result of its basis in the 
"vast industrial reserve army of extremely cheap labor." Because the production that draws on 
that reserve army utilizes such a small proportion of it and at such low wages, it generates too 
little demand to be absorbed where it takes place. "The markets supplied by the industrialization 
of the deVeloping countries are therefore predominantly overseas, primarily in the traditional 
industrial countries."42 There, of course, workers who formerly produced the goods (or 
components of them) now imported from the new sites become unemployed, adding to growing 
levels of unemployment which cannot be reduced precisely because it results from the 
fundamental structural transformation of the world capitalist system. Persistent high 
unemployment produces "long-term fiscal crisis" so that "outlays on social services are being 
cut, while ... higher social security Contributions and taxes threaten employees with a 
decrease in real incomes."43 In short, by crcating a "world market for production sites and for 
labor," the NIDL renders impossible the full employment on which WS are predicated.44 
41. Ibid., p. 44. 
42. Ibid., pp. 5, 45. 
43. Ibid., pp. 2-5. 
44. The idea that production is being reorganized into global chains, with different links in 
different parts of the world including the North, and the concomitant development of a world 
market for production sites and labor, seems to blur the distinction between the NIDL and 
globalization variants made by Gordon and others referred to earlier. The distinction holds only 
insofar as the NIDL view is formulated in terms of a division between core and periphery that 
corresponds to a division between the North and South. From a globalization perspective, the 
core-periphery division no longer corresponds to the North-South division as TNCs seek sites for 
different links in their production chains wherever advantages may be found throughout the world. 
Thus, labor processes associated with Southern labor regimes, typically using immigrants from the 
South, can be found within such "global cities" of the North such as London, New York, Tokyo, 
and Los Angeles. See Saskia Sassen, The Global City (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1991). TNCs from Korea invest in Britain and TNCs from Germany invest in the former 
Communist countries of Eastern Europe to take advantage of lower wages in those sites than at 
home. Financial Times, June 29, 1995 and July 11, 1995. However, the issue which the NIDL 
argument raises concerning the huge supplies of labor in Asia -- especially in China, India, and 
Indonesia -- and how they are utilized in production for the world market remains a highly 
challenging one as those countries press their integration into the world economy. 
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Many others have since presented a basically similar view of the impact which the 
spread of manufacturing from the old industrialized countries to the newly industrializing 
countries has had on WS while criticizing and modifying various specific aspects of the version 
of the NIDL model formulated by Frobel et al.. The flaws ascribed to the latter include 
genetalizations resting too narrowly on evidence from a few sectors with special characteristics 
(textiles, garments, electronic consumer goods), and even an insufficient differentiation among 
them, an exclusive focus on enclave industrialization through export processing zones to the 
neglect of broader patterns of industrialization, and too heavy an emphasis on TNCs as the 
agent of industrialization in the South to the neglect of domestic capital and the diverse roles 
played by different states.45 
However nuanced and qualified, arguments attributing the erosion of WS to growing 
competition from production shifted to new sites in the South continue to emphasize the impact 
of low labor costs there, in terms of working conditions and other labor standards as well as 
wages, and their slow growth relative to productivity growth. This, according to the "global 
Keynesian" version of the argument produces a vicious circle of worldwide demand deficiency. 
The whole strategy of securing competitive advantage by producing manufactured goods for 
world markets in the South where wage growth can be kept behind productivity growth -- by 
repressive labor regimes as well as large labor surpluses -- assures that demand there will be 
insufficient to absorb output, which can therefore be profitable only insofar as it is absorbed in 
the old sites of manufacturing production in the North. There, the competitive advantage that 
lower labor costs gives goods imported from the new sites erodes the market shares of goods 
produced in the old sites where wage growth had been kept up with productivity growth -- by 
democratic labor regimes as well as demographically and institutionally limited labor supplies. 
The result is deficient demand in the North, either through the loss of high-wage manufacturing 
jobs which are not replaced with others at similarly high wages or with sufficiently high 
alternative incomes, or through reductions in wage growth brought about by weakening unions 
and lowering labor standards. Deficient demand in the North adds to the unemployment created 
by the loss of market shares to imports from the South, which in turn reduces demand for those 
45. No review of the literature is offered"here. For a useful summary of the critiques by a 
writer who takes the NlDL model as the point of departure, see Jeffrey Henderson, The 
Globalisation of High Technology Production (London: Routledge, 1989), chap. 8. 
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imports, thereby adding to deficient demand in the South. Aggregate global demand 
consequently falls increasingly short of that needed to close the circuit between investment and 
consumption in the global capitalist system as a whole, steadily increasing worldwide 
unemployment.46 WS in the North are consequently undermined at the same time as poverty 
and inequality are perpetuated in the South. 
2. The Globali711tion of Finance 
In the argument focused on the globalization of finance, the most fundamental way in 
which it undermines WS is also by increasing unemplo),ment, just as in the the argument 
focused on the globalization of production. However, it does so by a different mechanism, 
operating through the constraints it imposes on the macroeconomic policy autonomy of national 
governments. According to a standard formulation of the argument by Michael Stewart, these 
constraints are systematically asymmetrical in their effects: they frustrate macroeconomic 
policies of governments that put higher priority on minimizing unemployment than on 
minimizing inflation relative to other governments. Thus, the globalization of finance has 
created a "deflationary bias" in the world economy. Stewart sums it up as follows. 
A country which unilaterally pursues deflationary policies, trying for example to reduce 
the growth of the money supply regardless of the implications for output and 
employment, is likely to be relatively successful in achieving it~ deflationary objectives . 
. .. A country which unilaterally pursues an expansionary policy, on the other hand, is 
much less likely to do so successfully. Forces at work in the international economy .. 
will tend to limit the extent of any such unilateral expansion. . .. The net effect of this 
asymmetry -- of the greater staying power of deflationary than of expansionary policies 
-- is a bias towards deflation in the world economy as a whole.47 
46. Variants of the global Keynesian argument can be found in Hartmut Elsenhans, 
"Rising Mass Incomes as a Condition of Capitalist Growth: Implications for Today's World 
Economy," International Organization 37, 1 (Winter 1983), and "Absorbing Global Surplus 
Labor," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 492 (July 1987)~ North­
South: A Program for Survival (Brandt Report), (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980); Walter 
Russell Mead, The Low-Wage Challange to Global Growth: The Labor-Cost Productivity 
Imbalance in Newly Industrialized Countries (Washington, D.C.: Economic Policy Institute, 
1990); and Collingworth, Terry, J., William Goold and Pharis J. Harvey, "Time for a Global 
New Deal," Foreign Affairs, January/February 1994. 
47. Michael Stewart, The Age of Interdependence: Economic Policy in a Shrinking World 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984), p. 48. 
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The "forces at work" are the pressures exerted by actors on foreign exchange market. ... 
(the international "financial community") who are able to shift enormous amounts of short-term 
capital almost instantaneously from the currency of a country to that of others.48 As described 
earlier, the gross volume of daily transactions on foreign exchange markets approached a 
$trillion in 1992. This exceeds "the total official reserves of all International Monetary Fund 
(IMP) member countries combined." It is estimated at twice to three times as much during 
"periods of intense speculation. "49 There is thus a huge discrepancy between the amount of 
capital that can be deployed against any currency and the official reserves with which central 
banks and the IMF can try to defend it. "In a market that trades $1 trillion worth of currency 
daily, the few billions that central bankers can buy and sell are peanuts." According to a 
"European central banker, 'central banks have realized that they cannot manipulate the markets 
that any battle of strength they would lose. "'50 
The volume of transactions on private international exchange markets rose rapidly to 
such massive proportions only recently, a... the data cited earlier indicate. During much of the 
Bretton Woods era of essentially fixed exchange rates, adjustable in principle only when 
"fundamental disequilibria" occurred and subject to international agreement, national capital 
markets were effectively insulated from each other, private international financial markets were 
minuscule, and most foreign exchange transactions were official, conducted by central banks 
and finance ministries. Moreover, these transactions primarily served trade, financing it and 
settling payments imbalances among trading partners, as well as international transfers 
instrumental to foreign policy. 
48. The actors consist of "government and central bank officials of countries [like] some of 
the OPEC countries... with large international reserves; key figures in the twenty or so largest 
international private banks; treasurers of multinational corporations -- particularly of th giant oil, 
car, and chemical concerns and other private sector fjnancial institutions such as pensio funds 
and insurance companies" plus "a few particularly influential stockbrokers and journalists." 
Stewart, The Age of Interdependence, p. 48. 
49. The total officials reserves were estimated at "$750 billion in September 1992, the last 
episode of intense one-way speculation." Eichengreen, International Monet,my Arrangements, pp. 
62,64. 
30. Business Week, July 17, 1995, p. 80. 
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The subsequent growth of private international finance, from the small beginnings of the 
Euromarket in the 19ffis to the global financial market in its current magnitude, is explained in 
different ways. The conventional wisdom, incorporated in the argument about the globalization 
of finance in question here, explains it by the development of the electronic technology that 
makes instantaneous shifts of unlimited amounts possible and by the increasing interest in 
utilizing it generated by the growth of international economic activity, in both the real economy 
in the form of trade and FDI and, more recently, portfolio investment as the insulation of 
national capital markets was broken down by deregulation and liberalization. But deregulation 
and liberalization are actions by governments, and an alternative explanation of the globalization 
of finance ascribes it primarily to those actions, and the domestic political dilemma') to which 
they were responses, rather than technology. 51 This alternative view is important for us, but 
here it is the consequences attributed to the globalization of finance, whatever its causes that 
concern us. 
The shift from fixed to floating exchange rates following the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods regime was followed by much greater volatility in exchange rates. 52 For those holding 
the growing amount of assets denominated in various currencies, this intensified the need for 
strategies to safeguard their holdings against losses from exchange rate changes. It also 
enlarged the opportunities for gains from speculation on anticipated exchange rate changes. 
Volatility and adaptations to it reinforced volatility, increasing its amplitude. Continuous 
adjusment of portfolios to maximize the risk-adjusted rate of return on them, financial 
innovation that provides new ways of doing so, such as various kinds of derivatives (and new 
business opportunities for the finanacial services offering them), and speculative movements 
that tum into self-fulfilling prophecies by generating runs on particular currencies all contribute 
51. Stewart, The Age of Interdependence; Michael C. Webb, "International Economic 
Structures, Government Interests, and International Coordination of Macroeconomic Adjustment 
Policies," International Organization 45, 3 (Summer 1991). For what is probably the most 
sophisticated formulation of essentially the conventional view, see Eichengreen, International 
Monetary Arrangements, chap. 4. The best elaboration of the state-centered alternative, as well as 
a an excellent survey of the conventional explanations, is provided by Eric Helleiner, States and the 
Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1994). 
52. Eichengreen, International Monetary Arraniements, p. 12, Figure 2.2. 
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to the hyperactivity on currency markets. The result is not just a tendency to make exchange 
rate changes overshoot the changes required for adjustment to changes in the "fundamentals" of 
macroeconomic relationships between countries but to overshooting in directions that confer a 
deflationary bias to the system a whole.53 
The effects of the operation of the system on an individual state's macroeceonomic 
policy autonomy can be expected to vary with a lot of factors, including the policy instruments 
used, the size of its markets (and hence its bargaining power) and whether its currency floats or 
is pegged in relation to others, unilaterally or by some international agreement (like the 
European Monetary System). Nonetheless, according to Stewart, the overall effects will be 
characterized by a deflationary bias. Thus, 
the response of the world financial community to policies ... expected to reduce [the 
relative] rate of inflation and strengthen its balance of payments and currency is likely, 
on balance, to validate and reinforce these policies. . .. Money will flow in, raising the 
exchange rate and thus putting further downward pressure on inflation, while at the 
same time enhancing the deflationary impact on output and employment of the original 
measures.54 
In contrast, policies that are more expansionary than those of other states "tend to be 
invalidated and aborted ."55 Money will flow out in the expectation of a higher relative rate of 
inflation, unless offset by interest rate increases, which would defeat the purpose of the 
expansionary policies. If, to continue the expansionary policies, interest rates are not raised or 
raised insufficiently, money would continue to flow out, depreciating the currency if it floats or 
depleting reserves if the currency is pegged. Depreciation tends to accelerate inflation by 
increasing import prices and generating pressures for compensatory wage increases, so as to 
53. In addition to works already cited, see also Kurt HUbner, "Flexibilization and 
Autonomization of World Money Markets: Obstacles to a New Long Expansion?" in Bob Jessop, 
Hans Kastendiek, Klaus Nielsen, and Ove K. Pedersen, eds., The Politics of Flexibility: 
Restructuring State and Industry in Britain. Germany and Scandinavia (London: Edward Elgar, 
1992); and Andrew D. Cosh, Alan Hughes, and Ajit Singh, "Openness, Financial Innovation, 
Changing Patterns of Ownership, and the Structure of Financial Markets," in Tariq Banuri and 
Juliet B. Schor, eds., Financial Openness and National Autonomy: Opportunities and Constraints 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
54. Stewart, The Age of Interdependence, p. 51. Emphasis in the original. 
55. Ibid., p. 52. Emphasis added. 
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produce an inflationary wage-price spiral that would require successively higher interest rates in 
order for the rate of return to foreign holders of assets denominated in the state's currency to be 
preserved. In the absence of such interest rate increases, the outflow of money. depreciation. 
and inflation, and yet more outflow continues. If the currency is pegged. the credibility of the 
state's commitment to the peg erodes as long as its expansionary policies continue, since its 
reserves continue to decline, approaching the point at which there are no more reserves with 
which the exchange rate can be defended, so that a devaluation is to be expected. The closer the 
state comes to the point at which it is forced to ch<x>se between devaluation or abandonment of 
its expansionary policy, the more likely the approach to that point will be accelerated by a 
speculative attack on the currency. In such a situation, speculators are in a position to make a 
"one-way bet." If the devaluation, which their actions make more likely, occurs, they have not 
merely avoided losses but made gains through the repurchase of the currency for less foreign 
currency than they earned when they sold it. In the unlikely event that the devaluation does not 
occur (e.g., if the state does abandon its expansionary policies or, perhaps on condition that it 
does so, other states choose to support the currency). they have not lost anything. Whether 
through depreciation or devaluation, the decline in the exchange rate will spur inflation by 
raising import prices, which may well fuel a vicious circle of declining exchange rates and 
inflation. To break the circle. the state will have to replace its expansionary policies with 
restrictive ones, increasing interest rates, as well as tightening fiscal policies, to dampen demand 
and stem the outflow of money. which means that it will have to deliberately increase 
unemployment. Thus. the "pressures on the government to modify or even abandon its 
expansionary policies will mount, and soon become irresistible."56 
There is an additional aspect to the threat to full employment attributed to the operation 
of global financial markets stressed by others. That is that the enhanced possibilities for 
maximizing the rate of return on financial investments by continuously redistributing them 
among assets denominated in different currencies, and the pressure this puts on states to meet 
expectations for returns on those investments by competitively raising interest rates, tends to 
make returns on financial investment higher than returns on productive investment. Combined 
with a decline in the rate of profit from industrial capital, according to Kurt HUbner. this has 
56. Ibid., pp. 51-2. The account of the argument draws as well on Eicbengreen, 
International MoneYV}' ArraoSements and Webb, "International Economic Structures. Of 
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"speeded up the sepamtion of the monetary sphere from the real economic sphere of the world 
market." Thus, "[m]oney and credit transactions no longer solely serve for investment 
purposes in the productive realm." 
[fhe world] money market itself has become a genuine realm for the valorization of 
capital. This indicates a drastic increase in liquidity preference of industrial capital as 
well as money capital holders, releasing a massive switch from productive to finanacial 
assets... [f]he monetary sphere can offer more favomble valorization opportunities as 
soon as the profit rates on productive capital and profit expectations of firms decrease.57 
However, financial investments continued to offer more favorable returns even when profit 
mtes on productive capital rose again from the mid-1980s, reflecting the extent to which the 
monetary and real spheres had been separated, with "negative effects on real economic 
accumulation processes." While writing from a neo-Marxist perspective, Hubner is able to cite 
the Bank for International Settlements in support of this view. 
Considerable high real earnings on short-term investments can be detrimental to 
production in that acquisition of liquid financial assets in place of consumer expenditures 
or stock-pile investments by private enterprises is promoted. In actuality these high real 
earnings offer an explanation for the fact that ... real income growth within the Group 
of 10 ... did not fully transfer into higher expenditures. 58 
Thus, the "process of real accumulation is. .. blocked by the monetary side of the valorization 
process."59 Summing up, the denationary bias resulting from the globalization of finances 
undermines WS by increasing unemployment not only through its inhibiting effects on short­
term expansionary macroeconomic policy but also through its inhibiting effects on long-term 
growth. 
The arguments that national economic policy autonomy and with it the viability of WS 
are undermined by the globalization of production and finance are of course not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, although some argue that one, typically financial globalization, is more 
58. HUbner, "Flexibilization and Autonomization;" and Cosh et al., "Openness, Financial 
Innovation," 
58. Bank for International Settlements, Annual Report 1987, p. 71, quoted in HUbner, 
"Flexibilization and Autonomization," p. 63. 
59. Ibid. 
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decisive than the other. We cannot review the entire literature here, but much of it argues that 
internationalization generally, including the mobility of both real and financial capital, constrains 
the governments of the ACCs in ways that prevent them from restoring full employment and 
forces them to roll back WS. All of these lines of argument are rejected by those that find the 
explanation for tendencies that threaten WS in developments within the ACCs, individually or 
as a group. 
Globalization Has Nothing to Do With It 
There are several lines along which it is argued that domestic factors, more or less 
common to the ACCs, far outweigh the effects of external constraints in accounting for the labor 
market trends that are threatening the viability of WS. I review three of them. One focuses on 
the relationship between technological change and the composition of demand for labor. The 
second focuses on the relationship between the distribution of power between labor and captital 
and profits. The third focuses on the relationship between macroeconomic policy regimes and 
cumulative price movements. Strickly speaking, neither the first nor second hold that 
international factors have nothing whatsoever to do with labor market developments; each of 
them ascribes some impact to those factors while holding that the domestic factors are the 
decisive ones. Only the third makes the strong claim that domestic factors are entirely sufficient 
to account for the trends without any recourse to changes in the international economy. I 
concentrate on the third and treat the other two more briefly.60 
]. Technological Change 
As formulated most forcefully by Robert Z. Lawrence, this argument is applied 
primarily to the United States although its causal analysis is applicable to all of the ACCs, and 
indeed to manufacturing throughout the world.61 It offers an explanation of changing labor 
market outcomes in the U.S., especially the growing inequality in real earnings of American 
workers. It focuses on the declining real wages of less educated U.S. workers most affected by 
60. We treat the first two so briefly only because time is running out. They will be treated 
more fully in the next revision of this paper. 
61. Robert Z. Lawrence, "Trade, Multinationals, & Labor," Faculty Research Working 
Paper Series, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, July 1994. 
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the decline of employment in manufacturing relative to that of other sectors. While the 
deindustrialization that has deprived so many of them of their jobs is typically blamed on 
increasing competition from low wage pnxlucers in the NICs and elsewhere in the South, the 
argument is that international trade has had little net effect on the size of the manufacturing 
sector -- and even less on employment throughout the economy because of the sector's small 
size relative to the rest of the economy. 
Instead the proximate cause of the decline in employment of less-skilled workers in 
manufacturing is identified as technological change. This has increased productivity in that 
sector, while slower productivity growth in the rest of the economy has retarded sufficient 
growth in jobs with comparably high wages to compensate. Moreover, the technogical change 
in manufacturing is biased "towards the more intensive use of skilled labor."62 Such 
technological change is found not only in home plants of American NCs but also in their foreign 
subsidiaries, including those in the developing countries.63 The decline in manufacturing 
employment in the U.S. is thereby concentrated on less-skilled workers, for whom there is no 
offsetting demand at equivalent wages in others sectors, so that real wages of those remaining in 
the sector decline not only relatively but also absolutely.64 
Note that the argument is addressed to the impact of the globalization of production as it 
affects trade in manufactures, taking into account the effects of FDI, but not to the impact of the 
globalization of finance and the destabilizing and deflationary consequences attributed to it. 
2. Labor-Capital Conflict 
This argument, along lines elaborated by Andrew Glyn, ascribes the higher levels of 
unemployment over the past two decades primarily to efforts by capital and governments in the 
ACCs to reverse the increases in the power of labor resulting from the extended period of full 
62. Ibid., p. 16. See also Jeffrey D. Sachs and Howard J. Schatz, "Trade and Jobs in 
U.S. Manufacturing," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1: 1994. 
63. Lawrence, "Trade, Multinationals, & Labor," espec. p. 26. 
65. The real wage decline for these workers was facilitated by the weakness of American 
unions, which were further weakened by the process as well as by hostile employers and 
government. Freeman and Katz, "Rising Wage Inequality," p. 48. 
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employment in the preceding decades of the "golden age" of rapid growth.65 Sustained full 
employment increased the bargaining power of workers, unorganized as well as organized, 
contributing to increased trade union membership and with it the labor movement's political 
in1luence. The result was increased distributive conflict, between different groups of workers 
a<;J well as between labor and capital. In the political arena, there wa<;J conflict over distribution 
of taxes to finance the increased social wage labor was able to win, which fed back into wage 
demands to the extent that the taxes fell on labor. In the labor market, labor-capital conflict was 
manifested by an increased strike rate, including the surge of wildcat strikes in the late 1960s 
and early 19708. Such distributive conflict generated upward pressures on prices. To the 
extent that full employment levels of demand enabled employers to pass wage increases on in 
prices, the consequence was inflation; to the extent that they could not, the consequence was a 
squeeze on profits. The latter tended to occur as increasing international trade subjected firms to 
competition that limited their ability to pass increased wage costs on in prices. The squeeze on 
profits was reinforced by the ability of workers to prevent a reduction in the rate of nominal 
wage increases despite a decline in the rate of growth of productivity, which was itself partly 
due to the inereasing power of labor to resist managerial controls and changes in the labor 
process designed to maintain productivity growth. By reducing industrial investment, the profit 
65. Andrew Glyn, "Social Democracy and Full Employment," Unpublished paper, May 
1995. Keynes anticipated, in 1943, "that a serious problem will arise a<;J to how wages are to be 
restrained when we have a combination of collective bargaining and full employment. Quoted by 
Glyn, "Social Democracy," p. 3. 
Michal Kalecki, who developed independently an approach to full employment similar to 
the one of Keynes, argued that the problem posed a fundamental challenge to capitalism. In his 
view, "under a regime of full employment, the 'sack' would cease to play its role as a disciplinary 
measure. The social position of the boss would be undermined, and the self-assurance and class 
consciousness of the working class would grow. Strikes for wage increases and improvements in 
conditions of work would create political tensions." While he believed that "the rise in wages 
resulting from the stronger bargaining power of the workers is less likely to reduce profits than to 
increase prices," he thought business leaders' concerns for workplace discipline and political 
stability would lead them to regard "lasting full employment [as] unsound from their point of 
view." As to inflation, whether it could be prevented "would depend on the institutional 
arrangements of the regime of full employment." In a famous passage, he concluded that '''Full 
employment capitalism' will of course have to develop new social and political institutions which 
will reflect the increased power of the working class. If capitalism can adjust to full employment a 
fundamental reform will have been incorporated in it." Quoted by Glyn, "Social Democracy," p. 
3. See also Andrew Martin, "The Dynamics of Change in a Keynesian Political Econonmy: The 
Swedish Case and its Implications," in Colin Crouch, ed., State and Economy in Contemporary 
Capitalism (London: Croom Helm, 1979). 
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squeeze reinforced the decline in productivity, thereby reducing the rate of output growth, 
intensifying distributive conflict, and exacerbating inflationary pressures or the profits squeeze, 
creating a vicious circle that replaced the golden age virtuous circle of full employment, growing 
demand, investment, output, and full employment. 
The "response from employers was to try, through economic policy and legislation, to 
restore their power in the factories, discipline at the wage bargaining table <lI1d control over the 
level of state spending."66 Although governments attempted to resist the vicious circle, sooner 
or later, depending on their political composition, the response from all of them has been to 
make a fundamental shift in economic policy, abandoning full employment in favor of restrictive 
macroeconomic policies that have resulted in increased unemployment and kept growth rates 
low. Thus the only way that has been found to reduce the distributive conflict that destabilized 
the economies of the ACCs has been to eliminate the full employment on which labor's power 
to engage in that conflict rested. The shift in macroeconomic policy, relying mainly on 
tightened monetary policy, has been accompanied by the erosion of institutional features of the 
golden age mode of regulation which reinforced labor's power, such as employment security 
legislation, collective bargaining rights, and rights to income support at high replacement rates. 
Hence, WS have been undermined directly and through the elimination of the full employment 
on which it depends in order to reverse the shift of power in favor of labor resulting from full 
employment. Stability has been restored by this pattern of policy, accompanied by a restoration 
of profits. But this has been accomplished in a way that precludes any restoration of the rate of 
growth that characterized the golden age because governments are committed to preventing 
expansion at a rate that would restore full employment, bringing with it a restoration of labor's 
power. 
Note that while this argument ascribes increased unemployment primarily to domestic 
factors within the ACes, it leaves some room for the impact of international factors. The 
spillover of macroeconomic policies among the ACCs, which are linked to each other by trade 
much more than they are with economies of the South, and especially the international financial 
66. Andrew Glyn, "Stability, Inegalitarianism and Stagnation: an overview of the 
advanced capitalist countries in the 1980s," paper prepared for the WIDER project on Savings, 
Investment and Finance, July 1993, p. 1. 
31 
instability to which the globalization of finance contributed, are cited as making it more difficult 
to maintain full employment, but not impossible. Commenting on the abandonment of full 
employment even by the social democracies most committed to it, Glyn contends that 
... conditions in the world economy and their influence on national economies do not 
constitute the fundamental block to full employment policies .... [They have] not ruled 
out policies for expanding employment where the costs for the rest of society are 
explicitly counted and willingly shouldered by the mass of wage and salary earners. But 
until social democracy can formulate and gain support for such an alternative, mass 
unemployment is liable to continue as the mechanism by which distributional conflict 
and other challenges to capital are contained.67 
3. Price Instability 
This argument, stated most strongly by Ton Notermans, is similar to the preceding one 
in that it finds the proximate cause of increased unemployment in the tum to restrictive 
macroeconomic policies in response to the operation of labor markets.68 However, the 
explanation of why governments have responded that way is grounded not in an analysis of 
conflict between capital and labor but in a view of the fundamental dynamics of monetary 
economies. According to this view, all such economies (Le., all modern market economies) are 
inherently vulnerable to cumulative, self-reinforcing price movements, downward as well as 
upward, depending on whether economic actors perceive governments to be implementing 
deflationary or inflationary policy regimes.69 Once such movements get beyond a certain point, 
governments can only stop them by credibly replacing the prevailing policy regime by one that 
supports price movements in the opposite direction. Governments must do so because in a 
"decentralized economy coordinated by the medium of money economic polices must necessrily 
67. Glyn, "Social Democarcy," pp. 13-14. 
68. Ton Notermans, "The Abdication from National Policy Autonomy: Why the 
Macroeconomic Policy Regime Has Become So Umfavorable to Labor," Politics and Society 21, 2 
(June 1993). 
69. See Peter Temin, Lessons from the Great Depression (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1990), for a discussion of the concept of macroeconomic policy regimes. 
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accord priority to maintaining relative price stability in order to ensure the coherence of the 
system."70 
From this perspective, the recent shift away from a full employment to an anti­
inflationary policy regime constitutes an epochal change, comparable to the opposite shift from 
the anti-inflationary policy regime embodied in the Gold Standard to the full employment policy 
regime on which postwar WS depend. In each case, all the ACCs made the policy regime 
change, although they did so at different times and in different ways, cataclysmic in the case of 
Germany, depending on the dynamics of their individual political economies. While the recent 
policy regime change is common to all the ACCs, however, this argument rejects the view that it 
is a response to changes in the international environment that is common to all of them. Instead, 
it is a response to a common problem that has its sources within the domestic political 
economies of each of them: the problem of inflation. But the theory of monetary economies 
invoked to explain the more recent policy regime shift is a general one applicable as well to the 
Great Depression shift to the policy regime that has now been reversed. According to the 
theory, monetary economies depend for their functioning on relatively stable and predictable 
values of money, that is prices. This condition is vulnerable to breakdown by expectations of 
price changes, either downward or upward. Such expectations tend to become self-fulfilling 
prophecies, given specific assumptions about the policy regimes to which governments are 
committed, producing self-reinforcing cumulative price movements that can be extremely 
disruptive to real economic activity. Markets cannot function unless states provide the 
institutional conditions necessary for them. The money through which market economies are 
coordinated is as, if not more, essential an institutional condition as property rights. Providing 
money is thus a generic function of states in market economies, and how they perform that 
function is decisive in shaping expectations about stability or instability of prices and the 
direction in which cumulative price movement., occur.71 
The Great Depression was a case in which expectations of a cumulative downward 
spiral of prices were ba..,ed on governments' implementation of a policy regime, the Gold 
70. Ton Notermans, "Social Democracy and External Constraints," Unpublished paper, 
January 1995, p. 13. 
71. Ibid. 
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Standard regime, that in fact assured that the deflationary spiral would continue. The results 
were everywhere so destructive that governments everywhere abandoned that policy regime, 
although it typically took changes in the composition of governments, sometimes drastic, for it 
to happen. But the alternative that replaced it proved vulnerable to upward price spirals, and 
postwar governments ultimately proved unable to pursue a policy regime aimed at maintaining 
full employment while curbing such inflationary spirals. This sustained expectations that the 
inflationary spiral would continue as long as governments remained committed to that regime, 
even if they intermittently pursued restrictive policies that temporarily curbed inflation until the 
policies were reversed to restore full employment, thereby reinforcing the conviction that 
governments were committed to implementing the full employment policy regime. This simply 
reinforced inflationary pressures, making inflation increasingly intractable. 
What made the full employment policy regime vulnerable to such upward cumulative 
price movements was the fact that there were no institutional arrangements capable of 
successfully combining full employment with price stability in any of the ACCs (with the 
possible exception of Japan), even the small open economies with nea-corporatist wage­
determination systems.72 Thus, none had been able to solve the problem inherent in a full 
employment economy that both Keynes and Kalecki already identified, in different form, back 
in the 1940s.73 Consequently, one after the other, governments abandoned that regime in favor 
of a restrictive monetary policy regime that increased unemployment, signalling their 
willingness to do what had to be done to restore price stability. The order in which 
governments successively made the policy regime shift depended on the specificities of their 
political economies, including the relative robustness of the institutions for reconciling full 
employment and price stability and the balance of political forces with different preferences for 
full employment relative to price stability, but all eventually succumbed. Thus, the common 
policy regime shift that has undermined WS was a common response to a common domestic 
economic problem, and no recourse to changes in the international political economy is needed 
to account for it. 
72. In this respect, Olyn and Notermans are in agreement. 
73, See footnote 66. 
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The very strong claim made by this argument is underlined when it is distinguished from 
another which offers an alternative explanation for the succession of regime shifts in different 
states stretched out over a decade and a half, between Gennany in 1974 and Sweden and 
Norway at the end of the 19808. It attaches different relative weight to domestic and 
international factors in accounting for the shift in the cases at different points in the sequence. 
In the earliest ca~es, domestic factors are decisive but international factors become increasingly 
compelling in the later cases, precisely because of the shifts already made in the earlier cases. 
Thus, Gennany shifted first because its response to the first OPEC oil crisis was shaped by 
political factors that gave price stability higher priority than full employment, Britain shifted 
soon thereafter because its particularly weak: institutions for reconciling full employment and 
price stability made it especially vulnerable to the disruptive effects of the oil crisis and 
consequential recession, as was also the case in the U.S., particularly after the second oil crisis, 
and so on.74 As successive states shifted from anti-unemployment to anti-inflation policy 
regimes, they progressively changed the international economic environment for the remaining 
countries. Those that tried to hold out against making the shift found it increasingly difficult to 
do so -- that is, the argument goes, it is harder to maintain full employment in some countries 
the more the other countries with which they trade increase unemployment so as to fight 
inflation. The hold-outs experience higher inflation than their trading partners, so their domestic 
producers find themselves at a competitive disadvantage. The hold.:outs experience deficits in 
their current balance of payments, international financial markets put their currencies under 
74. Note that, in this analysis, while the OPEC oil price rises are obviously events in the 
international political economy, reflecting the loss of America's power to maintain the postwar 
energy regime it had put in place, they do not constitute decisive changes in the IPE exogenous to 
the domestic economies of the ACCs. On the contrary, the oil price rises are part of, and were 
made possible by, an international commodity price boom generated by inflationary pressures in 
the ACCs, triggered initially by the Vietnam boom in the U.S. which resulted from the fiscal policy 
stalemate during the Johnson administration, and which fatally disrupted the Bretton Woods 
monetary regime. Thus, economic impulses were transmitted among the ACCs, affecting their 
domestic policy options, but it was the dynamics of the domestic political economy of the U.S.that 
was the main source of the impulses and of the political economies of the other ACCs that 
determined how much the inflationary impulses would be amplified or dampened in the process. 
The prevailing effect was to amplify them until the first OPEC price rise and, initally, to dampen 
them afterwards. The dampening effect was, in tum, attenuated in response to the high 
unemployment that resulted, unleashing new inflationary pressures that were more sharply reduced 
by the tum to drastically restrictive monetary policy -- the "monetarist shock" that accompanied the 
second oil price shock -- again first in the U.S. 
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pressure, devaluations in response to the pressure and in an effort to restore competitiveness 
merely intensify inflationary pressures, to which those domestic producers who produce for 
foreign markets respond by increasingly shifting their investment to their foreign markets. So 
the holdouts are eventually forced to give up on full employment as well and do what the others 
do to fight inflation. Thus, external pressures, created by the changes in the international 
economic environment resulting from the accumulating, mutually reinforcing joint effects of 
individual states' policy choices, eventually force all states to make the same shift in policy 
regime.75 
However, according to Notermans, this misidentifies the cause of policy regime change 
in the holdouts. From his point of view, the cause lies in the fact that the holdouts are no more 
able to solve the problem of maintaining non-inflationary full employment than the others -- i.e., 
all are victims of a common problem. Any that could solve it would be able to continue full 
employment even if the others could not. Thus, if a country had the institutional arangements 
that could achieve a better trade-off between inflation and unemployment than others, it could 
have lower unemployment than others without having higher inflation rates, so there would be 
no loss of competitiveness as far as prices were concerned. Under those circumstances, the 
internationalization of financial markets would pose no threat. As long as inflation rates were 
no higher, there would be no reason for financial market operators to put pressure on the 
currency. Moreover, even if inflation rates were moderately higher though not accelerating, 
there need be no loss of competitiveness as long as a flexible exchange rate policy could be 
pursued, permitting moderate depreciation just sufficient to offset the higher inflation rate.76 
This should be possible for a country endowed with institutions capable of preventing the 
effects of depreciation from accelerating inflation. It is precisely because no countries have such 
75. Stewart, The Age of Interdependence. makes an argument along these lines, based on 
the spillover effects of different countries policies on each other, in addition to the argument about 
the deflationary bias of the international financial system summarized above. 
76. It is argued that moderate inflation is necessary for systems of coordinated multi-level 
wage bargaining, like those in the Nordic countries, to work, because it allows unions at all levels 
to deliver some nominal increases to all their members, thereby permitting some adjustment of 
wage relativities without requiring the wages of any workers to fall. Juhana Vartiainen, "Can 
Nordic Social Corporatism Survive," Trade Union Institute for Economic Research, Stockholm, 
1994, cited by Glyn, "Social Democracy and Full Employment," p.12. 
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institutions that they have repeatedly tried to implement hard currency policies in order to 

provide an external anchor for resistance to inflation which domestic institutions cannot 

provide.77 
Likewise, the internationalization of production would not pose a problem. Since 
domestic producers for foreign markets suffer no price disadvantage from producing at home 
for export, there is no pressure to invest abroad, other things being equal. Other things are not 
entirely equal because there is, for example, a need for investment in foreign markets in order to 
be sure of access and to be close to customers. But such outward FDI does not necessarily 
undermine domestic employment, since it can also increase demand for exports, and there can 
be offsetting inward investment. This conclusion is only implicit in the price stability argument 
as elaborated by Notermans, since he does not address the globalization of production. But it 
follows from his argument that the relationship between the domestic economy and its external 
environment only becomes a problem because of the domestic sources of inflation with which 
governments cannot cope. So the root cause remains the absence of institutions capable of 
achieving that comparatively better trade-off, either through inability to create or maintain such 
institutions, rather than either the globalization of finance or production. Thus, the holdouts 
share the problem of inflation common to the other ACCs and ultimately make the same policy 
regime shift in order to cope with it. 
In many respects, then, the labor-capital conflict and price stability arguments are 
similar. They both challenge the belief that globalization is the source of the strains that are 
eroding WS. They do so more exhaustively than the technological change argument because 
they both address globalization of finance, which the technological change argument does not, 
at least as formulated in the American literature. All three arguments share the position that 
increased unemployment can be entirely accounted for by factors operating within the ACCs. 
The price stability argument goes furthest in insisting that it can be accounted for by factors 
operating within each of the ACCs individually. The technological change argument leaves this 
open because it does not take up the internationalization of finance. That does enter into the 
77. Ton Notermans, personal communication, July 18, 1995. When the commitment to a 
hard currency policy exacts politically intolerable costs in unemployment, the governments 
pursuing it are evidently forced to abandon it, as Sweden and Britian did during the recent currency 
turmoil in Europe. 
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labor-capital conflict argument as a factor that has made the pursuit of full employment more 
difficult, but not impossible, providing that the institutional conditions for avoiding inflation and 
a squeeze on profits can be met. Under those circumstances, the problem which lies at the core 
of the technological change argument would also be tractable. Thus, both the labor-capital 
conflict and prices stability arguments locate the source of the threat to WS in the the operation 
of the political economies of which WS are themselves a part.78 In particular, they both locate 
the source in the labor market institutions through which wages are determined. 
In doing so, both arguments depend on an explanation of why the problems rooted in 
the labor market institutions through which wages are determined get worse over time, so that 
they reach a point where the change in policy regime occurs. In the price stability argument, the 
explanation ultimately rests on the postulated tendency of all market actors (regardless of class) 
to act on the basis of expectations about price movements in one direction or another, 
depending on the policy regimes to which they perceive governments to be committed. This 
then produces cumulative prive movements in one direction, to which governments are soooner 
or later compelled to stop by adopting a contrary policy regime. In the labor-capital conflict 
argument, it is the postulated tendency of labor's power to increase in the context of a full 
employment policy regime, broadly conceived to include institutional underpinnings oflabor's 
power, leading to an increasing squeeze on profits, which precipitates the replacement of the full 
employment policy regime by one that maintains enough unemployment to weaken labor's 
power. However, there is an alternative explanation of why the problems rooted in the labor 
market institutions through which wages are determined get worse over time which is consistent 
with both the inflation and profits squeeze arguments but which rests ultimately on changes in 
the international political economy. That argument offers the third of the three answers to the 
question in the title. 
Globalization Has Something to do With It 
This argument, presented by Adrian Wood, links changes in the composition of demand 
for labor attributed to the globalization of production with the shift to restrictive macroeconomic 
78. There are obviously parallels between this argument and the nco-liberal critiques of the 
welfare state which allege that it impairs competitiveness, but the analysis and political judgments 
are of course different. 
38 
policies in the the ACCs through the responses of labor market institutions in the ACCs to the 
changes in the composition of demand for labor.79 It is thus consistent both with arguments 
that locate the sources of strain on WS in international factors and those that locate them in 
domestic factors. In the process, however, it denies the claims that might be advanced on 
behalf of either to provide adequate answers to our question: globalization does not have 
everything to do with the erosion of WS, nor does it have nothing to do with it; it does have 
something to do with it, but so do factors within the ACCs. However, the decisive factors are 
not technology, as in the technological change argument, but the institutions that structure the 
operation of labor markets under conditions changed by the globalization of production, as in 
the labor-capital conflict and price stability arguments. Because of this, and because it is built 
around a particular view of how labor markets in the North and South are linked by trade, our 
brief designation for it will be the labor markets argument 
The heart of the argument lies in the global distribution of the production of 
manufactured goods utilizing labor with different levels of skill. Three levels or categories of 
skill are distinguished. One consists of workers with education, training or experience which 
gives them skills beyond literacy -- "professional and technical workers, managers, and 
craftsmen."80 The second consists of workers with only a basic education which gives them 
literacy but no skills beyond that. The third consists of workers with little or no education so 
that they lack literacy as well as other skills. The second and third categories are both unskilled 
by comparison with the first but the fact that the former possesses literacy and the latter does not 
is a crucial distinction between them. What is crucial about it is that the unskilled but literate 
workers have the level of skills that modem labor intensive manufacturing by and large 
requires, while the unskilled illiterate by and large do not. 
What has happened over the past four decades is that there has been a change in the 
global distribution of the production of manufactured goods that utilizes unskilled but literate 
labor. At the beginning of the period, almost all of the production of such goods for world 
markets was confined to the industrialized countries of the North. Since then, and at an 
79. Adrian Wood, North-South Trade. Employment and Inegulaity: Changing Fortunes in 
a Skill-Driven World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
80. Ibid., pp. 6,41-56. 
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accelerating pace, an increasing proportion of the production of such g<xxis has been taking 
place in those countries of the South in which there has been a sufficient spread of basic 
education to provide a growing supply of unskilled but literate labor. This has been reflected in 
a dramatic change in the composition of North-South trade.81 Whereas manufactured goods 
accounted for only about 5 percent of the South's exports to the North in 1955, they accounted 
for over half by 1990. This tenfold increase in the share of manufactured goods in the South's 
exports to the North corresponds to an increase in value from less than $1 billion to about $250 
billion, amounting to an annual average growth of 15 percent in real (price adjusted) terms. This 
has enabled the South to finance increased imports of manufactured goods from the North. The 
big increase in the North's export of manufactured goods to the South has meant that the share 
of manufactured goods in the North's exports to the South has more than held steady, 
increasing from 73 to 79 percent. But the composition of manufactured goods in North-South 
trade has changed. The increased share of manufactured goods in the South's exports to the 
North is accounted for almost entirely by goods produced with labor that is literate but 
unskilled. Such unskilled labor intensive goods have ''vanished'' from Northern exports of 
manufactured goods, while the increase in Northern exports has been concentrated in skill­
intensive goods.82 In other words, there has been a decisive shift in the global distribution of 
exports of manufactured goods ptoduced by literate unskilled labor from the North to the South. 
This redistribution in the production of such goods has resulted in contrasting changes 
in the demand for literate unskilled labor relative to the demand for skilled labor in the North and 
South. In the North, the demand for unskilled labor has declined relative to that for skilled 
labor, while in the South the change in relative demand for the two categories has been the 
reverse. We focus for the time being on the change in relative demand in the North, for its 
81. The countries Wood includes in the North are usually those defined by the World Bank 
as "high income OECD members" or, previously, "industrial market economies," or the UN's 
"developed market economies," and sometimes all of the OECD, but alwasy excluding the former 
Soviet Union and Estern European countries (i.e., includes only the former West Germany. He 
usually includes in the South the UN's "developing market economies," plus China, Hong Kong 
and Singapore. Ibid., pp. 65-66. 
Most of Southern exports of manufactures concentrated in the four Asian tigers (Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore but exports from others, including China, India, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and the Philippines are increasing. 
82. Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
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consequences for the WS of the North is what we have to understand. There the change in 
relative demand has generated pressures for increased wage differentials and therefore increased 
income inequality. As we saw, there is evidence of such a reversal of earlier trends toward 
decreased differentials and inequality throughout the North -- that is part of the whole pattern of 
erosion of the WS that we observe and seek to explain. However, the extent of the pattern 
varies -- broadly, there is more of it in the U.S. than Western Europe.S3 Wood agrees with 
those who attribute these variations to the extent to which existing institutions make it possible 
to resist the pressures for increased differentials generated by the change in relative demand. 
The institutions through which the pressures are resisted are all those comprising the labor 
regimes that structure labor markets in WS, including trade unions and the transfer payments 
that put a floor on wages. To the extent that the pressures are thereby resisted -- i.e., to the 
extent that relative wages are "rigid" -- there is a mismatch between the demand and supply for 
the two categories of labor: there are shortages of skilled and surpluses of unskilled labor. This 
tends to add to the upward pressure on wages for skilled labor while increasing unemployment 
of unskilled labor. But precisely insofar as the institutions make it possible to resist this 
pressure for increased differentials, wage increases for skilled labor tend to be foHowed by 
wage increases for the unskilled labor that remains employed (the "insiders"). The joint effect is 
to accelerate inflation.84 This dynamic is summarized as follows: 
Skill shortages speed up inflation, since they cause money wages to rise faster, not only 
for skilled workers but also for unskilled workers (whose wage rises follow those of 
skilled workers because of the institutional pressure for relative wage rigidity). 
This aggravates the macroeconomic problem of reconciling low inflation with low 
unemployment. In technical language, it raises the equilibrium rate of unemployment 
or the NAIRU (the rate of unemployment that would be needed to prevent inflation 
from accelerating) .... What happens to the actual rate of unemployment depends on 
government policy towards inflation. . .. [I]f the government wants to stop inflation 
accelerating, it must deflate the economy to eliminate the shortages of skilled labour. 
This deflation amplifies the increase in unemployment among unskilled workers. 85 
83. See above, pp. 13ff. 
84. Woods, North-South Trade, pp. 290-323. 
85. Ibid., pp. 17. 
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Thus, the argument offers an explanation not only of why the problem of inflation has 
been a common one but also why it has become progressively more intractable over time, 
making it increasingly difficult to reconcile full employment and price stability through whatever 
institutions for doing so there may be, leading governments to respond, sooner or later, by 
shifting to an anti-inflation policy regime. From this point of view, the factors on which the 
price stability and labor-capital conflict arguments rest -- a tendency for price movements to be 
cumulative and self-reinforcing and a tendency for profits to be squeezed -- may be present, but 
they are not the decisive reason why the common problem of inflation confronting the ACCs 
becomes increasingly difficult, marked by a worsening trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment Instead, the decisive reason is the change in the relative demand for unskilled 
and skilled labor resulting from the accelerating change in the composition of North South trade 
in manufactured goods (and probably services as well). 
As an explanation of the worsening trade-off between unemployment and inflation, 
Wood's argument is evidently more applicable to Europe, and to a lesser extent Canada 
perhaps, than to the U.S. In the latter, it was possible for the shift in relative demand to work 
its way through relatively unhindered to increased earnings (and ultimately household) 
inequality, as we have seen, because of weakened unions and highly decentralized bargaining 
even where unions remain, as well as a meagre welfare state which does not support much of a 
"reservation wage." With labor's capacity to engage in distributive conflict so diminished in the 
U.S., the need for restrictive policy to undermine it, as postulated in the labor-capital conflict 
argument, is correspondingly diminished, accounting for the lower unemployment and greater 
inequality in the U.S. than elsewhere. Thus, the different apparent trade-offs between 
unemployment and inequality in Europe and the U.S. seem quite plausibly explained as 
different institutionally conditioned responses to the same basic pattern of change in the 
composition of demand for labor that Wood attributes to the change in the composition of 
North-South trade. I therefore refer to this as the labor skills argument. 
While Wood's argument can be reconciled with both the labor-capital conflict and price 
stability arguments, it is challenged by those who advance the technology argument, which he 
regards as the most plausible alternative explanation. The technology and labor skills arguments 
agree that the composition of demand for labor in the North has been changing, increasing 
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demand for skilled and decreasing demand for unskilled labor. Insofar as this is the case, it can 
probably explain much of the pressures on WS operating through labor markets, in the form of 
increasing unemployment, resulting mainly from policy responses to the increasing difficulty of 
reconciling low inflation and low unemployment, as suggested by both versions of the labor 
market argument. However, those who advance the technology argument disagree with Wood 
over the extent to which North-South trade is a factor: the technology argument says that 
technological change is independent of such trade and accounts for all or almost all of the 
change in the composition of demand for labor, while trade can account for very little if any 
because there is too IittIe of it relative the size of the North's economies. Wood contests the 
methodology of the technology explanation, concluding that the impact of trade is 
underestimated because it fails to take into account the effect of trade in inducing the very 
technological change that is presented as an alternative explanation.86 He argues that 
technological change in the North is itself a response to competition from increasing production 
using literate low-skilled labor in the South. The high (relative) price of such labor in the North 
makes production using it unprofitable, leading to the substitution of new technology for such 
labor, and increased demand for skilled labor to use the new technology, which makes 
production profitable even though the price of such labor is higher than for the displaced low 
skilled literate labor. This disagreement is one of the central issues in the wide discussion 
provoked by Wood's work and deserves further consideration in the light of recent or pending 
new analyses. 
Economic Pressures on Welfare States: A Tentative Conclusion 
As intimated earlier, I think a version of the third argument, that globalization has 
something to do with erosion of the WS but that it is not a sufficient explanation, is the most 
plausible. In this version, most weight would be put on sources of economic pressure on WS 
from within the ACCs, as in the second argument, but would incorporate the globalization of 
finance, which Wood does not take into account, as well as of production, on which his 
argument focuses. The globalization of both would be included as factors which have 
aggravated the economic pressures from within, making it increasingly difficult to cope with 
86. Ibid., espec. pp. 277-289. 
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those sources of pressure consistently with the maintenance of WS. I will suggest what this 
argument might look like by sketching out the causal chain it postulates between economic 
mechanisms and policy outcomes. I'll try to construct this causal chain in such a way as to 
show where the international and domestic dimensions of the economic mechanisms, 
respectively, may enter into it, and where the political factors enter into it. This version of the 
third argument is not offered as an answer to the question but as a plausible hypothesis on the 
basis of which to organize research -- i.e. as a heuristic device. 
We start with the change in the global distribution of production of traded goods and 
services that use labor of different skills. This lowers demand for low skilled and increases 
demand for high skilled labor in the North. Goods previously produced with low skilled labor 
in the North are either no longer produced in the North or are produced with new technologies 
that replace large numbers of low skilled labor with small numbers of high skilled labor, and 
that makes the production profitable despite the higher wages of the high skilled labor because it 
lowers the unit labor cost of the production. Thus, the changing composition of demand for 
labor of different skins in the North is the combined effect of the changing global distribution of 
production using those skills and of the development and application of new skill-biassed 
technology at least partially in response to the changing global distribution of production. 
We go on to the way this change in the composition of demand works through to labor 
market outcomes. Two sets of factors determine how it works through. The first are those that 
define labor regimes: the institutions that structure employment transactions, particularly unions 
and job security law; and the social policy institutions that determine alternatives to employment 
income, and hence the reservation wage. These variations in labor regimes produce outcomes 
that tend in two contrasting directions. They differ in the relative tendencies toward increased 
inequality and poverty and increased unemployment. There is a greater increase in inequality 
and poverty but less increase in unemployment in one than in the other. The higher inequality 
and poverty but lower unemployment outcomes are characteristic of the U.S., whereas the 
lower inequality and poverty but higher unemployment outcomes are characteristic of Europe. 
The second set of factors are macroeconomic policies. The levels of labor market 
outcomes are a function of differences in aggregate demand produced by variations in 
macroeconomic policies. Those policies are not independent of labor regimes. Insofar as 
variations in labor regimes refract the changing composition of demand for labor in different 
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ways, they are believed to determine the level of unemployment that is consistent with a non­
accelerating rate of inflation (the NAIRU). So labor regimes combine with policy objectives 
concerning price stability to shape macroeconomic policies, and those policies interact with 
labor regimes to produce the observed labor market outcomes. 
Both of these sets of factors that determine how the changing composition of demand 
for labor resulting from the global redistribution of production works through to labor market 
outcomes are functions of domestic politics as they have defined labor regimes and 
macroeconomic policies historically, however much domestic politics may have been 
conditioned by international factors. This is also true of the next links in the chain concerning 
the budgetary consequences of the labor market outcomes. 
Although the labor market outcomes fall into the contrasting patterns indicated before, 
both patterns put pressure on the budgets of WS by generating claims for transfer payments 
defined by social policy, even though the kinds of claims they generate are different. The high 
poverty and inequality pattern tends to generate relatively more claims for social assistance, 
whereac; the high unemployment pattern tends to generate relatively greater claims for 
unemployment benefits. Each is also associated with other pressures for government 
expenditures, related to the demographic distribution of the outcomes and particular societal 
factors. The high poverty and inequality pattern in the U.S. is associated with high 
expenditures on prisons, whereas the high unemployment pattern in Europe is associated with 
high expenditures on early retirement. 
The extent of the resulting pressure on budgets of WS depends not only on the levels of 
claims for transfer payments defined by social policy but also the way tax policy defines the 
financing of transfer payments. Even an increase in relatively low levels of payments can 
precipitate a fiscal crisis of the WS if taxation levels are relatively low, as in the U.S., just as an 
increase in relatively high levels of payments can do so even if taxation levels are relatively 
high, as in Western Europe. Thus, it is the whole tax-transfer structure that determiQ.es the 
vulnerabJility of a WS to fiscal crisis. The variations in tax-transfer structures are of course 
also functions of the domestic politics by which labor regimes have been historically defined. 
Macroeconomic policy is an important determinant of the extent to which there is a fiscal 
crisis, since macroeconomic policy affects the volume of claims on the WS by influencing rates 
of growth, and hence the amount of revenues from employment income relative to the volume 
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of claims, with a given tax-transfer structure. The consequences for WS obviously depend on 
how governments respond to the fiscal crisis. The old Keynesian response was to accept 
budget deficits resulting from the fall of employment income relative to rising transfers. 
Governments would enter the bond markets to finance the deficits by borrowing, in the 
expectation that it would increase economic growth, thereby increasing employment and 
reducing unemployment, eventually eliminating the gap between revenues from employment 
income and expenditures on transfers. Indeed, the increase in transfer payments thereby 
financed are expected to contribute to that by keeping aggregate demand from falling as much as 
it would as a result of decreased employment income in the absence of the transfers -- i.e., the 
idea that transfers function as automatic stabilizers. 
However, powerful constraints now operate against such a response according to both 
of the first two arguments concerning the economic mechanism by which WS are eroded. The 
difference between them is that the first attributes the constraint to the globalization of finance 
whereas the second attributes it to the inefficacy of domestic institutions for reconciling full 
employment and price stability. Thus, the first tells us that governments can't finance increased 
deficits by borrowing because international financial markets won't lend to them, except at 
interest rates that will defeat the expansionary intentions of the budget deficits. The second tells 
us that governments won't increase deficits to increase growth and decrease unemployment 
because they believe reduced unemployment will result in a renewed acceleration of inflation in 
the absence of domestic institutions capable of preventing it. 
Accordingly, as long as either mechanism is at work, and governments retain the 
respective beliefs about the behavior of bond and labor markets, governments will not respond 
to the increased aggregate volume of claims to transfer payments resulting from the labor market 
outcomes of the changing composition of demand for labor, whichever way the latter works 
through to the outcomes, by pursuing an expansionary fiscal policy. The consequence must be 
a persistence of those labor market outcomes which generate the increased claims. There are 
various alternatives to expansionary fiscal policies that governments might pursue. The choice 
among the alternatives may depend in part on which mechanisms governments believe are at 
work. In any case, this is another point in the chain of causality in which political factors are 
decisive. To illustrate, I first list some alternatives. 
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One alternative is to counteract whatever increase in deficits may be produced by 
redefining the tax-transfer structure. Governments now do so mainly by redefining the claims 
so as to lower the level of payments rather than by increasing the level of taxes -- in other 
words, by rolling back the WS. This leaves the economic mechanism producing the labor 
market outcomes unaffected but alters their budgetary consequences. 
A second alternative is to make changes in the institutions for determining the terms of 
employment so as to increase the attractiveness of employing unskilled labor. Governments do 
so by reducing statutory rninimium wages, reducing the power of trade unions to prevent the 
wage of low wage workers from falling relative to those of other workers, or by offering wage 
subsidies to employers who hire unemployed unskilled workers. This intervenes in the 
economic mechanism so as to alter labor market market outcomes in ways that may reduce 
budgetary pressures from claims generated by unemployment (unless subsidized workers 
simply replace unsubsidized workers) though not necessarily from claims generated by poverty 
or wage subsidies. 
A third is to do whatever can be done to change the skill composition of the supply of 
labor to conform more rapidly than it otherwise would to change in the skill composition of 
demand for labor. Governments now do that by various forms of change in education and 
training institutions, including formal education, active labor market programs for retraining, 
lifelong education, and so forth. This intervenes in the economic mechanism so as to alter the 
labor market outcomes, although this in tum can only ease the budgetary pressures over the 
long-run. 
A fourth is to do whatever it can to lower the level of unemployment at which inflation 
accelerates -- i.e., lowering the NAIRU -- so as to permit macroeconomic policies to be more 
expansionary. While the difficulties governments encountered in their attempts to do this 
through incomes policies in the past contributed to their tum to a macroeconomic policy regime 
relying on restrictive policies to prevent inf1ation, there are indications that some governments 
now may be renewing such attempts. This intervenes in the economic mechanism so as to alter 
labor market outcomes in ways that may ease budgetary pressures by decreasing the level of 
unemployment at a given level of demand and inflation rate, thereby increasing the ratio of 
revenues from employment relative to expenditures on transfers. While changes in the skill 
composition of supply as in the third alternative can also contribute to this, their effectiveness in 
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this respect depends on macroeconomic policies creating enough demand to match but not 
exceed the increased supply of skilled labor. 
Governments might pursue any of these alternatives regardless of whether globalization 
or domestic factors are believed to be the sources of budgetary pressures. However, there are 
other alternatives that might be pursued if globalization were viewed as a major source of the 
pressures. Some alternatives would be addressed to the globalization of production. 
Protectionism, unilateral or multilateral on a regional basis, would intervene at an early stage in 
the economic mechanism postulated by the globalization argument, so as to limit the competition 
from producers using lower cost literate unskilled labor, thereby preventing the labor market 
outcomes generating budgetary pressures. Another alternative, which free traders sometimes 
identify as protectionism but which should be distinguished, is to make imports contingent on 
the observation of labor standards enabling workers in low wage countries to keep their wages 
from lagging behind productivity growth. Thus, the international trade regime would be 
modified to make labor standards part of the rules. According to the global Keynesian 
argument, and contrary to the orthodox free-traders' objections, this would increase demand in 
the South, thereby increasing demand for imports from high wage countries and hence 
employment income and revenues in the latter, so that the combined effect in North and South 
would be increased global aggregate demand and employment. 
Other alternatives would be addressed to the globalization of finance in an effort to 
counteract the tendency for large, rapid capital movements to overshoot and cause very large 
fluctuations in exchange rates and to produce the postulated deflationary bias. The analog to 
protectionism would be the reimposition of capital controls, again unilaterally or multilaterally 
on a regional basis. A less drastic alternative would be to "throw sand in the wheels of 
international finance," as some economists have recommended. This would include such 
measures as the "Tobin tax," deposit requirements on foreign exchange transactions and dual 
exchange rates. Yet another, more comprehensive alternative would be to recreate an 
international monetary regime through which international public authorities would peIform the 
functions of a central bank, either for a regional common currency area like the proposed EMU 
or the international economy of multiple currencies. 
Strategies for coping with the different sources of pressure on WS from globalization 
are obviously not mutually exclusive, and if they are believed to be the globalization of both 
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production and finance the strategies may be regarded as mutually reinforcing. Similarly, if the 
sources of pressure are believed to be both international and domestic, strategies for coping with 
both may be mutually reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive, although it is conceivable that 
pursuing either might accomplish more than pursuing neither. 
Whatever conclusions one reaches about the economic mechanisms that put pressures on 
WS and the possible responses to those pressures, the policies governments actually adopt in 
response to the pressures will obviously depend on the political mechanisms that shape the 
choice of policies. Understanding those political mechanisms is the next major task that has to 
be carried out in order to analyze what links, if any, there are between globalization and what is 
happening to WS. Anticipating that analysis, I do not expect that it would show causality 
running in one direction, from the economic mechanism to policy outcomes, with the political 
mechanism acting as a set of intervening variables, filtering and refracting the pressures 
generated by the economic mechanism to produce policy responses to those pressures. On the 
contrary, I would expect it to show causality running both ways, so that political choices 
themselves also have consequences for the economic mechanism and the pressures it produces, 
in its international as well as domestic dimensions. Not surprisingly, I would expect 
economics and politics to interact, but equally unsurprisingly, I would expect the interaction to 
take place over time, so that it can only be demonstrated through an historical account or a 
dynamic model. Since I don't know how to do dynamic systems modelling, my analysis will 
have to take the form of an historical account And since the interaction of the economic and 
political mechanisms will be analyzed in terms of how actions are shaped by distinctive 
economic and political institutions which change over time, the analysis will have a strong 
resemblance to what people these days are calling historical institutionalism. 
Pending more work on how to analyze the political mechanisms that link the economic 
mechanisms that generate pressures on WS to the policy outcomes that are to be explained, I'll 
just illustrate very sketchily some of the lines along which I think the analysis would run. 
The Politics of Pressures on Welfare States: A Trial Run 
Given the striking differences in labor market outcomes and social policy responses to 
the consequent pressures on WS in the U.S. and Western Europe, an obvious way to frame the 
whole effort is to analyze those differences and try to understand how political mechanisms 
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interact with economic mechanisms to produce those differences and associated WS policies. 
Here, in very preliminary and reckless fashion, is where I expect such an effort to lead. 
I proceed on the assumption that some form of the third argument about the economic 
mechanism will prove most applicable: globalization, and more narrowly, internationalization, 
has something to do with the erosion of the WS in both the u.s. and Europe, but it is limited 
and specific in different ways. As far as the globalization of production is concerned, trade is a 
smaller part of U.s. GDP than of the European countries, but most trade on both sides of the 
Atlantic is with other countries in the same region, so competition from cheap labor producers is 
not a large factor in either -- as argued by the proponents of the technology argument who hold 
that trade is much too small to account for more than a small portion of the observable labor 
market outcomes. For the U.S., regional trade has a larger component of trade with less 
developed, low wage economies, e.g., Mexico. There is less diversity in levels of development 
within the EU, to which a very large portion of trade is confined. Trade with the rest of the 
world accounts for under 10 percent of aggregate European GDP. Moreover, since there is 
currently a surplus in Europe's trade with the rest of the world, the argument that there is a 
problem with Europe's competitiveness, and that the European WS is somehow to blame for it, 
is suspect. To be sure, the trade balance might be turned negative in a European economy 
which was booming enough for unemployment to be significantly lowered. But it is not clear 
that this would translate into a current account deficit that would necessarily constrain growth, 
particularly insofar as European currencies continue to tloat against the rest of the world (i.e., 
primarily the dollar). If there are issues of competitiveness, they are largely issues concerning 
the competition of European companies in each others' markets -- although this might have to be 
qualified in view of the opening of Eastern Europe. 
Financial internationalization has different consequences for the u.s. and Europe. 
While the u.s. may no longer be the hegemon that organizes the international financial regime, 
U.S. economic policy does not seem to be much constrained by international financial markets, 
while the heavy weight the dollar continues to have in international financial markets means that 
fluctuations in its exchange rates still have a large impact on the currencies of other ACCs. On 
the other hand, the economic policies of the individual EU member states seem to have been 
much more constrained by movements in and out of their currencies in the foreign exchange 
markets. That at least is one of the main arguments advanced in favor of a single currency. But 
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a coordinated expansion which left relative "fundamentals" roughly the same, while exchange 
rates were left free to adapt to unavoidable unevenness in expansion, could conceivably 
minimize the vulnerability of European expansionary policies to frustration by the markets 
nearly as well as the adoption of a single currency. It would undoubtedly permit a greater 
decrease in unemployment than possible under the strategy for moving to a single currency that 
was adopted in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU). Why that strategy was 
adopted and what it has to do with pressures on European WS therefore become the crucial 
questions, to which I will return. 
, Whatever the relative importance of pressures generated by international and domestic 
economic mechanisms on WS now, internationalization probably contributes very little to 
explaining the differences in the patterns of social policy that have been historically established 
in the U.S. and Europe. Explaining those differences has of course been a major industry 
whose work it is not necesssary to duplicate. The main point is that the domestic political 
dynamics that have shaped the distinctive variants of the WS in the U.S. and Europe continue to 
operate. My hunch is that they probably have much more to do with what is happening to WS 
on both sides of the Atlantic than globalization and internationalization. 
While the international exposure of the U.S. economy has undoubtedly increased, 
including outward foreign direct investment as well as trade, it is hard to see how that 
contributes to explaining the course of WS erosion in the U.S., which has most recently 
witnessed the all-out attack on Federal social policy mounted by the conservative Republicans in 
Congress led by Gingrich and powerfully supported by the Christian Right, culminating in 
President Clinton's signature of the legislation ending the Federal government's guarantee of 
social assistance. To be sure, there is a large business component to the coalition for rolling 
back what there is of an American WS. Small business evidently perceives a stake in low 
wages as well as low taxes, while the financial sector sees lots of money to be made from 
private medical services and privatizing pensions.87 While there are multiple sources of 

political pressure to roll back the American WS, it is a rollback from the low level of what 

87. It turns out that even erosion of social assistance offers opportunies for making 
money. Large information systems and management consulting corporations now see multibillion 
dollar business opportunities in contracting with states to operate the new "welfare to work" 
programs for which they have been given responsibility by the new legislation. The New York 
Times, September 15, 1996. 
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Skocpol describes as a bifurcated WS, which is highly vulnerable because of the division 
between entitlements (social security pensions and health insurance for retirees) and means­
tested transfers (social assistance).88 What is especially important about this is how the 
establishment of this structure and the current attacks on it tap the politics of race that has so 
profoundly shaped American political development.89 So what is happening to the American 
WS can probably be explained almost entirely in terms of domestic political mechanisms, 
without any resort to international economic mechanisms. 
In the European case (cases, really, since the individual country situations vary as well 
as interact within the process of European integration), the political choices producing the 
pervasive and persistent pattern of restrictive macroeconomic policy, and the high, long-term 
unemployment it ha"l sustained, are central to the pressures on WS. The epochal shift from a 
macroeconomic policy regime geared to maintaining full emplo}ment to one geared to curbing 
inflation has evidently been more far-reaching in Europe than in the US., as reflected in the fact 
that unemployment levels which were lower in Europe than in the US in the earlier postwar 
period have been higher in Europe than in the US. since the early 1980s. In the US. the shift 
was most clearly marked by the tum to extremely restrictive monetary policy by the central bank 
88. While the separation of the wide, relatively advantaged and mobilized constituency for 
pensions by right ("entitlements" in American parlance) and the narrow, relatively disadvantaged 
and unmobilized constituency for means-tested social assistance renders the latter more vulnerable 
to attack, the former may not be secure over the long run. The bifurcated WS may be vulnerable to 
a sequential divide-and-conquer process, in which entitlements are attacked once there is little left 
to social assistance. As noted above, the mass of money flowing through the public pension 
system is a highly attractive target for financial business, and hence for a government attuned 
(ideologically orland financially) to the latter's interests. Paul Pierson makes a similar point more 
generally: "Universal programs do tend to be stronger, but because of this they also are much 
larger and generous. Because they are often directly in competition with private alternatives, they 
also present a much more serious challenge to the market-oriented preferences of conservative 
government. Means-tested programs tend to remain small, stingy, and restricted to groups unable 
to afford private provision. The result of these differences is that a government committed to 
radical change finds its attention naturally drawn to universal programs." Dismantling the Welfare 
State? Reagan, Thatcher. and the Politics of Retrenchment (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), p. 170. ' 
89. The literature is vast, but a long view of the political legacy of slavery can be gained 
from Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1966), Chapter III; C. V ann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, Sec. ed. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1966; Jill Quadagno, The Color of Welfare (New York Oxford 
University Press, 1994); and Thomas Byrne Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The 
Impact of Race, Rights. and Taxes on American Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991). 
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in 1979 (the Volcker shock) but the overall macroeconomic policy stance was fairly quickly 
made less restrictive by the Reagan administation's fiscal policy. In Europe, the 
macroeconomic regime shift occurred successively in different countries, ranging from 
Germany in 1974 to Sweden in 1991. The party composition of governments evidently affected 
the timing and to some extent the intensity (i.e. degree of restrictiveness) of the shift but it 
ultimately occurred in all countries. However, governments succeeding those which had 
initiated the shift typically increased its intensity, suggesting the weakening of electorates' low 
unemployment expectations as a parameter of party competition. 
While individual European governments made the shift at different times, it was 
incorporated into the strategy for further European integration through the design for transition 
to and operation of EMU. The latter, insofar as it is implemented, would amount to a step 
toward political union in institutionalizing European monetary but not fiscal policy capability 
i.e., equipping the EU with instruments for implementing the restrictive macroeconomic policy 
regime but not with those that can generally more effectively serve an expansionary 
macroeconomic policy regime. Tying themselves to the convergence criteria (on inflation, 
budget deficits, and public debt) to which they committed themselves in the TEU, European 
governments (even those that do not necessarily anticipate entering EMU initially or possibly 
ever) are perpetuating the restrictive regime despite extremely low levels of inflation and in the 
face of Depression era levels of unemployment. With expansionary macroeconomic policy 
thereby ruled out, microeconomic, or "supply-side," measures, designed to increase labor 
market "flexibility," are widely urged as the only way to reduce unemployment. This serves as 
the rationale for erosion of the WS in various ways, particularly by lowering the replacement 
rates of transfers, and hence the "reservation wage," as well as by decreasing job security and 
increasing wage dispersion. Initiatives in this direction have had varied success, with conflict 
over them frequently dominating politics, as in Germany at the time of writing. 
For some, as noted earlier, the ultimate objective of such changes in European labor 
regimes is to make them more closely approximate the one prevailing in U.S., to which they 
attribute lower unemployment and higher employment growth in the U.S. -- the so-called "great 
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American jobs machine."90 It is plausible to argue, as Wood does,91 that labor regimes in 
Europe resisted market pressures toward greater inequality (resulting from the changing 
composition of demand for labor with different skills) more effectively than in the U.S., 
resulting in a higher NAIRU and hence the need for higher levels of unemployment to reduce 
inflation and prevent its renewed acceleration. But the different institutions that refract the 
impact of change in the international economy differently are the legacies of differences in the 
past politics of distributive conflict. Insofar as change in the international economy is the source 
of new strains on those institutions, suggesting the need for change in the institutions, 
opportunities for undoing the past settlements of distributive conflict are opened up. However, 
there are alternative ways of adapting to the changing composition of demand for labor, as 
indicated above (and Wood himself points out), as there are to other developments (e.g., 
demographic trends) which point to needs for change. These alternative ways have diverse 
distributive consequences, defining some of the issues in renewed distributive conflict, as 
expressed in muted form in terms of "positive" as opposed to "negative" flexibilization. At the 
same time, the shift toward a restrictive macroeconomic policy regime itself undoes the past 
settlements of distributive conflict, while altering the interests at stake in renewed distributive 
conflict and the resources with which to press those interests (e.g., the relative bargaining 
power of labor and capital in the market arena). Thus, if the economic mechanisms putting 
pressure on WS operate roughly as suggested by the variant of the third argument sketched 
above, the explanation for the variations in policy responses to those pressures is probably to be 
found largely in the systematic differences between the domestic politics of distribution in the 
U.S. and Europe (and within Europe). 
In the European case, however, it is not just the domestic politics of distribution within 
the individual countries that shapes policies toward WS, for they are decisively conditioned by 
the politics of European integration. Above all those policies, as well as the economic 
mechanisms generating the pressures to which the policies respond, are conditioned by the 
incorporation of the restrictive macroeconomic regime into the design for monetary union. 
Hence, the political choices thereby embodied in the TEU have to be explained in order to 
90. See above, pp. 15-16. 
91. See above, p. 40. 
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understand what is happening to WS in Europe. As suggested above, the idea that EMU was 
designed to free European economic policy to pursue lower unemployment by eliminating the 
vulnerability of the separate national currencies to speculative whipsawing is not very 
persuasive, since other alternatives could conceivably achieve the same or better resul.ts in terms 
of employment than the particular strategy adopted for EMU. The one mentioned earlier is a 
coordinated expansion which left relative "fundamentals" roughly the same, while exchange 
rates were left free to adapt to unavoidable unevenness in expansion. Another is the rapid 
introduction of a single currency and European central bank in advance of any convergence of 
economic fundamentals instead of the other way around, as agreed in the TEU, along with the 
establishment of substantial capacity for fiscal redistribution in order to ease adjustment. In one 
form or another, these alternatives were proposed, but they were defeated. This suggests that if 
an economic objective was decisive, it was not lower unemployment but rather the continued 
prevention of inflation -- i.e., the deliberate institutionalization of the restrictive macroeconomic 
regime at the European level, where it would presumably be less easily threatened by domestic 
political reactions against the consequent continuation of high unemployment. 
However, even if such an economic objective was widely shared (by governments 
coping with higher inflation which sought an "external anchor" for monetary policy as well as 
governments enjoying lower inflation which sought assurance that a common currency would 
be managed in such a way as to preserve low inflation), it might not have been decisive. An 
alternative explanation is that the further political integration of Europe was the decisive 
objective, and that the particular formula for EMU that emerged from the bargaining process 
was what was necessary to secure the main goal. In this view, the geopolitical objective of 
tying Germany to the rest of Europe so as to avert yet another disastrous intra-European war 
was what set the process of European integration in motion. However, this rationale for a 
united Europe did not suffice to secure the political support on which integration depended. 
Accordingly, reliance was placed on what Jacques Delors described as the "economic approach" 
to political integration, consisting of successive increments of economic integration, in the 
expectation that the requirements of economic integration would lead to increased "pooling of 
sovereignty" in European institutions. This is essentially how European integration has in fact 
proceeded, from the European Coal and Steel Community through the Common Market, the 
European Monetary System, and the Single Market, to the Economic and Monetary Union. For 
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this strategy to work, however, the forms of economic integration had to be consistent with the 
interests of those whose political support was decisive, principally business and economic 
policy elites. Hence, the dominant thrust has been market opening rather than market 
regulation, emphasizing the removal of barriers to transborder transactions rather than common 
rules governing social policy and industrial relations. Once the single market increment was on 
course, a single currency was looked upon as offering the best prospect of the next increment, 
not least because it would strengthen the European institutional structure by entailing the transfer 
of monetary policy authority to a European central bank. As envisaged by some, notably 
DeIors, the transfer of macroeconomic policy capability would not be confined to monetary 
policy but would include increased, if still modest, fiscal policy capability. But what emerged 
from the bargaining was not this broader vision of economic and monetary but one much more 
narrowly confined to monetary union. Moreover, it was one framed very much in terms of the 
restrictive macroeconomic policy regime to which most European central bankers were generally 
committed and on which the German central bank especially insisted. Thus, a strategy for 
monetary union consistent with this commitment, including the stringent requirements for 
deflationary convergence, was a condition for securing agreement on the next increment of 
economic integration through which the further political integration of Europe was to be 
achieved -- a fundamental goal which was given renewed urgency by the unification of 
Germany.92 
Whether this view of the political sources of the particular strategy for EMU that was 
adopted is supported by the evidence remains to be seen. However, if something like this view 
is confirmed, it suggests that what is happening to European WS can be largely explained on the 
basis of the interaction between the domestic politics of European states and the politics of 
European integration. While the latter is certainly in part a response to changes in the 
international political economy, those changes probably contribute little to explaining the 
political choices entering into the shift to a restrictive macroeconomic policy regime which most 
92. This view is suggested by (though not entirely attributable to) accounts presented in 
George Ross, Jacques Delors and European Integration (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995); 
David Cameron, "Transnational relations and the development of European economic and 
monetary union," in Thomas Riss-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non­
state Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995); and Dorothee Heisenberg, The Mark of the Bundesbank: Germany's 
Role in European Monetary Cooperation (Dissertation, Yale University, 1996). 
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fundamentally undermines European WS, and the strategy for European integration through 
which that shift has been generalized and institutionalized. Thus, in both the U.S. and Europe, 
my expectation is that what has been happening to WS is to be explained largely by the 
distinctive oynamics of politics within each rather than the common pressures exerted by 
globalization. 
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